Why are Elections in Kyrgyzstan so Competitive? Theories and Evidence from Earlier Electoral Cycles

October 26, 2011

October 26, 2011 

Dr. Fredrik M. Sjoberg, New York University, USA

Abstract: In a neighborhood of autocracies Kyrgyzstan stands out as the only country with competitive elections. To this day, no coherent theory explaining this has been presented. In this talk Dr. Fredrik M. Sjoberg examined the history of elections in Kyrgyzstan and shows that election outcomes is a reflection of the balance of power between different elite segments. Of particular importance are the economic elites that emerged in Kyrgyzstan as a consequence of considerable market reforms in the 1990s.

The form of competitiveness that Kyrgyzstan experienced in 1995-2009, where clientelism was pervasive and accountability mechanisms weak should not, however, be confused with democracy. For those who advocate democracy and genuine political participation, competitive authoritarian regimes can be used as an informative cautionary tale. Power matters, and especially so in authoritarian states. Understanding the logic behind competitive authoritarianism helps us revise strategies for lasting democratic reforms.

Bio: Fredrik M. Sjoberg is a Visiting Scholar at the Department of Politics, New York University. He holds a PhD degree from Uppsala University and an MPhil degree from London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). His book Competitive Elections in Authoritarian States can be downloaded at http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:430803/FULLTEXT01.

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