Introduction

The Tian Shan Policy Center focuses on research, analysis, and implementation of appropriate and effective public policy in the nations and communities of Central Asia. In the context of our work on human rights, migration, and social protection we have initiated a project addressing migrants' rights. The TSPC received a grant from the Open Society Foundations Central Eurasia Project for the implementation of the Project on "Protecting the Rights of Kyrgyz Migrants" (2012-2014). The purpose of this briefing document is to generate discussion at the Research Workshop on September 13, 2012 that can help guide the Tian Shan Policy Center’s research agenda for 2012-13.

The rights of Kyrgyz and other Central Asian migrants continue to be violated in Russia and other countries where they work. The current policies and programs of governments in the region are not sufficient to address the ongoing human rights violations. As the Kyrgyz government is now initiating an internal review within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other agencies on an appropriate set of migration policies, there is a need to bring various stakeholder groups together to consider existing policy deficits and to build consensus around the opportunities for more innovative approaches to reform based upon sound research and analysis. This is also timely given the new migration policies being considered by President Putin to liberalize migration in Russia.

1 The project is supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundations
The TSPC Project will undertake research on key issues that can inform this debate. It will use the findings from this research to bring stakeholders together to engage in critical dialogue and more concerted action by human rights and labor groups, diaspora networks, progressive business leaders, and at a later stage, government allies that want to advance systematic reform in migrant protection in Kyrgyzstan, as well as in Russia and other parts of Central Asia.

The objectives of this initial Research Workshop are to (1) make more transparent the measures taken by Russia and Kyrgyzstan; (2) identify gaps in protection for labor migrants; and (3) identify and prioritize the research questions for further analysis that could help raise awareness of options to improve human rights protection of migrants. The TPSC will utilize findings from the research to facilitate greater stakeholder dialogue and support informed advocacy on policy reform.

**Background**

Central Asian countries are clearly marked by complex population movements within their territories and migration abroad. These movements are driven by myriad factors, including demographic, social, political, and economic development within the countries. Russia and Kazakhstan are the main destination countries for Central Asian labor migrants, spurred in the past decade by the rapid economic growth in these countries, lack of visa regime, and a shared common language. In Kyrgyzstan, labor migration is generally motivated by the hope to improve living conditions and the economic status, with the hope of securing better social welfare, health care, education, working conditions and higher wages.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asians have increasingly migrated to Russia due to economic hardship and limited opportunities in their home countries. Since 2001 there has been an increase of 10% in inflow of foreign population into Russia; the number of Kyrgyz people migrating temporarily or permanently to Russia has nearly doubled in the last 10 years. Migration as such is not a novel phenomenon in this region, but the migrant composition, including their protection needs, have become more complex in recent years. Migration issues are multifaceted, and it is very complicated to solve every aspect of a problem.

The exact number of migrants in Russia is difficult to estimate because of large numbers of undocumented workers. The World Bank estimates that there are 12.5 million foreign workers in Russia (2011), while the Russian migration authorities estimated roughly five million, of which only one million are in the country legally. In June 2011, the official Russian figures were revised upwards to 9.5 million, of which six million entered the country in 2011. The International Labor Organization (ILO) reports for Kyrgyzstan:

“During the last decade Kyrgyzstan became a country of origin of labour
migrant for CIS countries, and the third largest Central Asian supplier of labour migrants to Russia (after Uzbekistan and Tajikistan). The officially recognised figures of labour migration outflow from Kyrgyzstan is estimated at 340,000 people, but some estimations give figures as high as 500,000 or even 1 million…Out of 340,000 migrants…about 300,000 people work in Russia. It is well known that the majority of labour migrants come from the southern parts of the country…

External migration is likely to continue in the near future. A sociological survey by Gallup came to the conclusion that currently about 20% of the population in Kyrgyzstan would like to leave the country. Many labour migrants strive to get Russian or Kazakhstan’s citizenship. Thus, according to the existing data, about 100,000 Kyrgyz citizens have received Russian citizenship during the last 5 years."

According to the Crisis Groups Asia Report 2010, 800,000 Kyrgyz migrated to Russia from 2004 to 2008, finding jobs mostly in low paid work local people did not want to take.

Russia now has the second-largest migrant worker population in the world after the United States, and migrants face a number of challenges. As documented below, it is apparent that Central Asian labor migrants working in Russia are particularly vulnerable to abuse. They often face exploitation, discrimination, poor working conditions, and lack of access to health care, pensions, and education. While many migrants participate in trans-border work programs and pay taxes in Russia, there are few legislative and institutional protections in either the sending or receiving countries to effectively protect their rights.

Though Russia has signed a number of ILO conventions that require it to provide basic labor protection for all workers, human rights groups criticize Russia because it fails to conform to international human rights standards on the treatment of labor migrants, especially from neighboring Central Asian countries. Extensive legislation on migration has been developed but with contradictory laws, by-laws and regulations. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have ratified the principal migrant workers’ rights treaty – the UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families – but Russia has not.

Though Russia has not signed the Migrant Workers convention, it has signed all eight of the core ILO conventions regulating workers’ rights, including conventions prohibiting forced labor and the convention on discrimination in employment and occupation which prohibits discrimination at the workplace, the convention on the protection of wages and on occupational safety and health. Russia has also signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which requires it to prevent discrimination in the workplace and to
ensure access for the disadvantaged, including limited working hours, and has signed, but not ratified, the European Social Charter. The Russian Constitution prohibits discrimination on any grounds, as does the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), all of which Russia has ratified.10

Article 21 of the Russian constitution prohibits “torture, violence or any other harsh or humiliating treatment or punishment.” The European Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention against Torture all prohibit inhuman and degrading treatment. The European Court of Human Rights has held, including in cases against Russia, that detaining persons in sub-standard conditions of detention as well as ill-treatment of detainees will violate the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment.11

The ILO reports that all CIS Member States signed the Agreement on Cooperation in Labor Migration and Social Protection of Migrant Workers in 1994, which includes the provisions of mutual recognition of diplomas, rules of employment in the destination country, and equal treatment between migrant workers and national in respect of social security, social insurance and medical care. This agreement provides a statutory basis for protection of migrants but it applies only to legally resident labor migrants and does not include members of their families—changes would and necessitate bilateral agreements.12

While the major human rights treaties ratified by the Central Asian countries and Russia do provide some level of protection, the failure to implement these standards fully and at the national level has led to discrimination and widespread abuse of migrants. In addition, there is insufficient national and regional legislation and co-operation between countries promoting regulated migration flows.13

There are several bilateral agreements signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan. One is the Agreement on Labor Migration and Social Protection of Migrant Workers signed by them in March, 1996. An updated Agreement, signed by Russia and Kyrgyzstan on September 22, 2003, provides for simplifying employment and regulating the order of the work of Russian citizens in Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz citizens in Russia. An Agreement on simplified procedure of receiving citizenship by citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic for permanent residence in the Russian Federation and by citizens of Russia for permanent residence in Kyrgyzstan was ratified by the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic No 33 on May 24, 1997. An Agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russia on cooperation in migration was concluded in Moscow on April 18, 2003. A Memorandum on Cooperation in Social and Labor between Ministry of Labor and Social Development of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection
of the Kyrgyz Republic was signed on January 20, 2004. These agreements, however, lack detailed protection measures for migrants. Coupled with a lack of substantive migration policy in the Kyrgyz Republic, migrants have few means of utilizing these former agreements to ensure their rights are protected.

The lack of protection by both sending and receiving countries in the Central Asian region is a particularly egregious omission considering the enormous migrant remittances that contribute to supporting the economies of Central Asia. Remittances are an important source of income for the governments as well as households.

The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) recently calculated the official remittance trends and reported the following charts indicating the amount of remittances as a portion of GDP for 2010.\(^{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) As per UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

\(^{**}\) Computed on the basis of remittance outflow data from the Central Bank of Russia.
Remittances have gone from USD 78 million in 2003 to 1,037 million in 2010\textsuperscript{15} which will remain a driving factor for migration to Russia, due to limited opportunities in Kyrgyzstan.

The debate on migration is increasing in Kyrgyzstan. The government now is considering a new migration strategy to serve as a basis for migration policies, creating an urgent need for more robust policy analysis and dialogue among stakeholder groups on new approaches to reform. More specifically, the Kyrgyz government is in the process of developing a “Strategy of Migration Policy in the Kyrgyz Republic until 2020.” According to the Concept of the Strategy, the new policy regulating external labor migration will be based on:

1. Building sustainable systems of government incentives and social support for the continued presence of migrants in destination countries;
2. Creating conditions for social, cultural adaptation and employment for returning citizens and their families; and
3. Enhancing labor migration capabilities through improved competitiveness of human resources and diversification of the geography of migration flows that focus on actions related to professional development training of citizens going overseas and an expansion of the geography of their residence.

In addition, there will be some special components of the Strategy-2020 requiring flexible measures of government regulation and the adoption of both operational measures and preventive initiatives in the medium and long term: the "Kajrylman" Program (work with ethnic Kyrgyz working abroad and returning to their historical homeland); the fight against human trafficking and unregulated migration; refugees; attraction of foreign labor; and immigration control.\textsuperscript{16}

The migration debate in Kyrgyzstan has tended not to be supported by solid investigation and reporting. Many stakeholders lack deeper understanding of best practice or models being used and tested in other regions that could be salient in this region. There have been few resources in the past directed at conducting solid research and analysis of how to protect migrant rights. These analytical tools can support more informed advocacy and dialogue in this field.

The following sections discuss a number of key issues related to human rights protection and areas that the TSPC and other experts believe are important areas to mine for potential model policies and best practice in the future. These will be explored during the Research Workshop.

1. Abuse and discrimination in employment

Labor migrants coming from Central Asia are vulnerable to potential abuse in Russia (and many complain of abuses in Kazakhstan as well) throughout the entire migration process: from the
exploitation by facilitators, such as private recruitment firms, to work situations without formal employment contracts in which migrants have minimal rights and suffer exploitation and abuse. Migrants who live outside their home countries become a vulnerable social category. Those who overstay their visas, or enter without appropriate registration documents become undocumented or ‘irregular’ migrants and can more easily be exploited or victimized by employer abuse. For all these workers, protection of their rights is indispensable.

Abuse in recruitment and trafficking

Labor migrants have different possibilities for finding employment in Russia and for obtaining the necessary documents to work. These involve official as well as unofficial means with either state recruitment agencies or private recruitment firms. Basically, there is one state employment recruitment agency under the Kyrgyz Ministry of Youth and Employment, whereas private recruitment agencies have two branches, one of which includes agencies officially approved by NGOs or trade unions, and the other private or unregulated agencies that can be involved in human trafficking.

Although numerous migrants do go through organized channels, such as official recruitment agencies or the state, and may initially enter receiving countries in the region legally, they may become irregular by working without legal permissions (overstaying the time period allowed) or by not following legal aspects of their residence abroad. This may stem in part from a desire to retain access to employment opportunities in the host country. This irregularity is also, to a large extent, due to varying labor laws adopted by the respective countries and the lack of information provided to migrants regarding legal work requirements and migration channels. Faced with difficulties in obtaining necessary documents for orderly migration due to lack of understanding the rules, high costs, or limited legal employment opportunities, many migrants turn to irregular channels.

Beyond arranging employment, some private intermediary firms offer services, such as placement of foreign nationals on the migrant registry and arrangement of work, which is not legal. Due to Russia’s quota system and difficult procedures in obtaining residence and work permits, some migrants utilize these intermediary firms to obtain documents rather than the Federal Migration Service, as the law requires. A question is whether regulation in Russia or Kyrgyzstan has attempted to tighten requirements for these firms. It is clear that a valid residency registration and work permit are required in order to obtain a legal employment contract, which is the only way migrant workers’ employment and long-term stay remain regular.

The human rights group Memorial in Russia has documented a number of serious problems affecting migrants. In the first step of the migration process – in finding employment and obtaining necessary documents – migrants become subject to abuses by recruiting firms, which
according to the agreement’s terms only provide consultation services and have no liability for their actions. \(^\text{22}\) Exploitation by these agencies include delayed provision of services with consequences of having to leave the country or loss of money, contrived migration registration and provision of false work permits and confiscation of passports, in most cases leading to an undocumented situation. \(^\text{23}\) These abuses especially result from migrants’ low levels of literacy, poor language skills and lack of basic legal knowledge, lack of official information and deceptive advertising by private intermediary firms. \(^\text{24}\) According to a report by Human Rights Watch in 2009, 90 percent of these intermediary firms are informal, abusing migrants by arranging employment relationships with abusive employers and by providing them with false or improper documents. \(^\text{25}\)

Accordingly, some migrants can lose their legal status through actions of intermediaries in the process of entering Russia illegally, making them more vulnerable to exploitation, or overstay and not obtain mandatory residency within a 3-day period with the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS).

Numerous cases of trafficking of persons for forced labor in Russia have also been reported by the OSCE which notes that undocumented migrants remain vulnerable victims to labor exploitation: “…[T]he more precarious the legal status of the migrant worker, the greater the dependence on the employer, and the more vulnerable they are to exploitation. […] A significant number of [migrant workers] are victims of trafficking, and more than it has been recognized to date.” \(^\text{26}\) Human Rights Watch states that the main method of coercion involves confiscation of documents, nonpayment for services and physical abuse, making them defenseless and vulnerable. \(^\text{27}\) According to the U.S. Department of State, “one million people in Russia are exposed to ‘exploitative’ labor conditions that are characteristic of trafficking cases,” \(^\text{28}\) involving methods of coercion, and “people from Russia and many other countries, including Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Asian countries, are subjected to conditions of forced labor in Russia.” \(^\text{29}\)

**Abuse by employers**

As a second step of abuse, once the migrants arrive in Russia, they are faced with sometimes exploitive work practices by their new employers. Abuses by Russian employers towards migrant workers are myriad. Human Rights Watch has, for example, documented that apart from passport confiscation by employers, such violations include employers’ denial or delay of wages, directly executed violence or threats by employers against migrant workers, including threats of extradition to authorities \(^\text{30}\), refusal of employers to provide written contracts, exposure to excessive working hours and inhumane working conditions. \(^\text{31}\)

The ILO reports that abuse is compounded by labor migrants’ low education and low awareness of legal terms connected to their employment. \(^\text{32}\) Migrants from Central Asia to an increasing
degree are low-skilled, possess low levels of education and have poor knowledge of Russian. Russian employers, however, often use Kyrgyz migrants for low skilled jobs irrespective of their actual qualifications, to fill open jobs nationals are not willing to take. These jobs to a large extent are in the informal sector, the so-called grey economy, in which these above-mentioned written employment contracts are not provided. According to the survey on Employment, Unemployment and Labor Migration (2006), Kyrgyz migrants work in construction (46%), commercial trade (36%), agriculture (6%) and in various industries and services (3%).

Undocumented migrant workers who have lost their legal status in the process of utilizing intermediary firms have no options of engaging in legal employment and thus become victims of abuse through illegal confinement of documents (confiscating and retaining of passports), forced labor, and violence. According to ADC Memorial “employer and the intermediary firm are almost always connected by a retainer services contract, of whose conditions the workers are not informed.” This means that advanced payments are given to the recruitment firm, which decides on the amount passed on to the migrant workers.

Due to violations of employment permit rules (by not obtaining a valid residency registration and work permit and thus not being able to obtain a legal employment contract), migrants cannot or are fearful to try to avail themselves of the protection of labor law. Despite these violations of their rights, migrants are afraid to turn to law enforcement officials who could treat them as criminals, put them in detention, and possibly expel them from the country.

**Response to abuse by Russian authorities**

Although Russia increasingly depends on and facilitates hiring of foreign workers, the Russian government sets low quotas for labor migrants, consequently pushing many migrants into illegal residence. President Putin, in response to anti-immigration attitudes, suggested criminalizing the irregular status of labor migrants to Russia, simultaneously arguing that labor migrants merit harsher rules due to their aggressive attitudes.

The United Nations treaty body, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which protects non-citizens’ labor rights, states in its General Recommendation No. 30 that even those without work permits who are in an employment relationship are eligible for employment rights. This applies to labor migrants in Russia, as many migrants there work without work permits, whether it is due to expired quotas, slow processing of permits, or refusal of the employer to provide a formal contract. Although Russia has ratified international conventions on labor and human rights, human rights groups believe that labor migrants do not experience the protection of these treaties.
The entire process of intermediary firms and actions conducted by employers stand in contradiction with Russian labor legislation as well as with both the UN and the ILO standards on labor rights.\textsuperscript{42} Further, International and Russian law proscribe forced labor and trafficking.

Another issue is that migrant workers do not have access to methods of redress and prosecution of employers violating migrants’ rights, whether documented or undocumented. Advocates, such as Human Rights Watch, have urged the Russian government to prioritize investigation and prosecution of these employers abusing their employees and to make available effective avenues for redress to migrants and other affected people independent of their contractual status.\textsuperscript{43}

Russia has in recent years made revisions to its migration laws, facilitating the process of obtaining mandatory residency registration and work permits for those who do not need a visa to enter Russia. More migrants are able to regularize their stay and work in Russia. However, difficulties still remain for some migrants due to legal procedures and bureaucratic obstacles.\textsuperscript{44} The laws and procedures for those obtaining work permits changed in 2007. It became possible for those in possession of residency registration to directly apply for a work permit at the FMS or through an employer or intermediary firm. Previously it was only possible to get a work permit through the employer, which directly linked their legal status to the employer and thus made them more vulnerable.\textsuperscript{45}

As noted above these changes may have made some migrants less vulnerable to abuse by employers but in turn has led others in irregular status to use exploitive private intermediary firms, with the risk of some becoming victims of trafficking.\textsuperscript{46}

The continuing rights violations in Russia demonstrate that Russia needs to do more to help combat abuse in employment. Moreover, the failure of the Kyrgyz government to adopt clear migration and human rights policy initiatives to protect workers in Russia continues to leave Kyrgyz migrant workers vulnerable.

\textbf{An area of research and investigation for the TSPC might be on the following:}

\begin{itemize}
  \item What type of model frameworks using international standards and best practice can feasibly be implemented in Russia and Kyrgyzstan to establish a more effective regulatory system for employer abuse and accountability?
  \item What type of migration policy should the Kyrgyz government adopt to address abuses in the employment of Kyrgyz workers abroad?
\end{itemize}
2. Xenophobia and violence against migrants

Xenophobia and Discrimination

Once in Russia, many migrants from Central Asia are faced with xenophobic perceptions, open discrimination by the Russian society, and racist acts. Undocumented migrants become extremely vulnerable to discrimination due to lack of protection by officials and abuse by the police, legal maltreatment, fining (involving corruptive practices such as the acceptance of bribes), document confiscation, as well as violence in detention and deportation.47 Both detention practices and xenophobia exhibit extreme human rights abuses. According to the UN special rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance “Russian society is facing an alarming trend of racism and xenophobia.”48

Human rights obligations require the prohibition of discrimination of any kind, including that based on citizenship and national origin. According to the Crisis Group Asia Report N°183, anti-migrant sentiments are rising in Russian society due to the lack of knowledge by society of the contribution migrants make to the economy and perception of the country’s loss through unpaid taxes and the migrants’ remittances invested in Central Asia.49 An additional factor may be competition for local jobs. The emergence of xenophobia, racial stereotyping and intolerance remain ubiquitous in Russia among minority nationalistic groups and those who support them.

Human rights groups report that there is open hostility against Central Asian ethnicities which contributes to an environment that encourages violations of the migrants’ social and economic rights. Few organizations or state institutions assume responsibility in providing support and protection for affected migrants.50

A report in the Eurasia Daily Monitor asserted that in 2011 twenty people were killed and approximately 130 people were injured due to racist attacks in Russia.51 According to the report, most violent attacks occur in Moscow and St. Petersburg and were acts against Central Asian migrants. The Russian Information and Analytical Center “SOVA” estimated ten killed and 24 wounded injured people last year. The authors of this report pointedly note that only the “severe cases of hate crimes are reported, including murders, stabbings, or severe injuries. Most other cases go unrecorded because the migrants lack legal status or are afraid of complaining to authorities.”52 The report notes that “hundreds of Tajiks and Kyrgyz (along with labor migrants from other former Soviet states) die in Russia every year, mostly due to hazardous working conditions, health problems and attacks from neo-nationalist movements. According to some estimates, one in every one thousand migrants is in danger of dying in these ways; reportedly, over 600 Tajik citizens died in Russia last year (http://goo.gl/2dWak).”53

Xenophobic attitudes in society are reinforced by media and government. The Crisis Group Asia reports that due to increasing public beliefs that migration flows to Russia should be restricted,
the media strengthened negative cultural stereotypes through TV shows and newspapers parodying migrants and accusing them of spreading crime and diseases. The authors report that xenophobia ranges from violence to systematic discrimination, such as forcing migrants to change the endings of their last names.54

The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) has reported significant problems with xenophobia, noting that Konstantin Poltoranin, the former spokesman of the Russian FMS, was dismissed of his duty after stating that the white race was under threat in Russia in April 2011.55 After attacks against visible minorities from Central Asia in December 2010, former President Medvedev addressed the severity of violence of ethnic conflicts and with this demonstrated the necessity to prioritize integration issues within Russia.56 KAS’s investigation suggests that the Russian state loses approximately USD 200 million in tax revenues every year as a result of irregular migration, which was increased by stricter immigration criteria and lower quotas. Failed immigration policies between 2002 and 2006, which encouraged the perception that illegal immigrants were a national security risk, also may have contributed to hostile sentiments.57 So far there is a lack of any coherent policy of integration and the issue of migration is still being used by politicians to satisfy claims of nationalist sentiments, which according to the KAS International Report 2012, should not be underestimated.58

Abuses in arrest and detention

ADC Memorial asserts that law officials are engaged in punitive anti-migration expeditions and corruption. In some cases, police stop migrants to allegedly verify their documents. The migrants are randomly detained and confronted with violent practices by law enforcement officials, and are targeted for bribes and extortion.59 Undocumented migrants are at an extremely high risk of being detained if their status is detected.60

Once in detention, ADC Memorial reports that attempts to identify affected migrants, and procedural requirements, can be prolonged up to a year. Migrants are detained in prison-like conditions and consequently may be deported.61 Human rights groups have documented instances of torture. In one instance, ADC Memorial reports that a migrant was beaten and kicked for an extended period of time before being taken to the FMS where he was fined for violating migration regulations.62 Human Rights Watch has documented numerous cases of law enforcement officials demanding bribes from migrants and physically abusing and humiliating them, and other cases of forced labor at police stations and elsewhere.63 According to former Deputy Speaker of Parliament Kubanychbek Isabekov, 1200 Kyrgyz citizens were in detention in Russia in August 2012.64

Advocates report that labor migrants do not have sufficient access to consultancy services, including legal advisors, when situated in detention or confronted with violence. Labor migrants preferentially refer to entities such as local diaspora groups, embassies and consulates and some
NGOs when encountering abuse. These entities have no legal enforcement mechanisms and often use informal methods and approaches to support migrants, rarely abiding by government structures.\textsuperscript{65} Although the forming of trade unions encounters legal limitations in Russia, advocates encourage migrants to be made aware of the existence of such trade unions and thus consider joining one.\textsuperscript{66} For example, the Central Asia Regional Migration Programme (CARMP), jointly implemented by IOM/UN Women and the World Bank, initiated the project “Mobile consultations on the wheels”, which was implemented in July 2011. Representatives of the Trade Union of labor migrants and the IRC were appointed to provide direct services to migrants coming to Russia with information and consultations about the future life in Russia on the train (route: Dushanbe – Moscow). In total, 273 persons received consultations, and more than 1,000 informational materials were distributed.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{Response by Russian authorities}

The Russian government is trying to more rigidly prosecute cases of violence led by xenophobia. According to one report, 329 nationalists were convicted for hate crimes in 2010, twice as many as in 2009.\textsuperscript{68} There has apparently been an increase of prosecutions of violent hate crimes, especially murders. Nevertheless, aggressive racism and xenophobia continue to rise.\textsuperscript{69} An International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) assessment of the human rights situation in 2011 suggested there is little hope with regard to the intentions of the ruling government: the work of human rights defenders and independent journalists is seriously hindered, while the judicial system responds more to the demands of the government than to the rights of victims, furthering a disturbing atmosphere of impunity, including with regard to the long list of murders of representatives of civil society.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{An area of research and investigation for the TSPC might be on the following:}

- What type of model frameworks using international standards and best practice can feasibly be promoted in Russia or implemented by the Kyrgyz Government to establish a more effective regulatory system for preventing and challenging human rights abuses?
- How can international human rights mechanisms be better utilized to challenge abusive practices relating to migrant registration, detention, discrimination of migrants, lack of training among judges and prosecutors?
- What are the emerging conflicts and potential crises among growing urban migrant communities in Russia and Central Asia, and what can we learn from other regions?

\textbf{3. Protection of migrants and the welfare of women and children}

The majority of Kyrgyz labor migrants in Russia do not have access to many basic services such as free or low cost health care, state social security, or education for their children.
Access to Health Care

Many migrants can only access paid medical services, which leaves them vulnerable to health threats. Many fear they cannot turn to medical service because they risk deportation. Thus often when migrants get sick they do not receive medical help. There have been reports that some women who give birth do not take their newborn children from the maternity houses for fear of deportation.

With the introduction of the new Tax Code in Russia in January, 2010, employers do not pay social tax for temporary migrants, thus these migrants cannot get Compulsory Medical Insurance (CMI) polis that gives access to free healthcare. Thus CMI polis is only issued to Russian citizens and permanent migrants with appropriate status, leaving all temporary and undocumented migrants with no access.

Women and children are the most vulnerable groups to sickness and disease. Less than 10% of migrant women and nearly 30% of children have access to free medical care in Russia. About 40% of migrants treat themselves at home and pay for medical care for their children. At present, all migrants can call for emergency care or an ambulance. But beginning in January 2013, according to the new law on CMI, the ambulance services will be financed by the CMI budget—this appears to mean that all foreigners who do not have CMI polis will not be entitled to call an ambulance without cost or to receive free emergency care at hospitals. Women migrants also lack access to reproductive services. Their low-awareness of contraceptives leads to a higher risk of HIV and other infections spread among migrants, which has increased the number of abortions and tendencies of child abandonment.

The majority of temporary labor migrants can only benefit from paid medical services that are too expensive for migrants. This has increased health risks and has led experts to call for more access by labor migrants to preventive medicine, diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis and HIV.

Child education

According to estimates, 10% of migrants come to Russia along with their children of school age. Migrant children of school age lack access to schools when their parents do not have residence registration or medical cards. Migrant children are also at risk because of low levels of Russian language knowledge.

In many cases children do not attend schools but work in markets or on construction sites. According to a report on women migrants from CIS countries in Russia, only 10% of CA migrants’ children go to preschool educational institutions, like kindergartens.

Social Security

A key problem for migrants is the issue of social security and their pension accumulation. Upon reaching a certain age (men – 63, women – 58) a Kyrgyz citizen retires and receives his/her
monthly allowance, pension. The provision of pensions in the Kyrgyzstan is based on personal responsibility of the insured and strict correspondence of pension payments to amounts of insurance contributions and to pensionable service with the use of personalized registration and personal insurance accounts of citizens. This means that if a Kyrgyz migrant working abroad does not accumulate pension by sending 2% of the average salary to the Kyrgyz Pension Fund, his/her pension is not accumulated. This means that the migrant upon retirement is entitled only to a base (minimum) amount of the pension - 530 soms per month, which is around USD 11.

Response by Russian authorities

In 2011, Russia adopted a law on contributions to the Russian Pension Fund by legal migrants working in the country. This law is a first step in addressing the pension issue. In the beginning of 2012, the governments of Russian and Kyrgyzstan began negotiations on pensions regarding a mutual setoff scheme for citizens of both countries in which Kyrgyz labor migrants working in Russia will be able to now accumulate their pension in the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation and vice versa. When the migrant returns to Kyrgyzstan at the end of his/her employment in Russia, the funds accumulated in the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation will be transferred to his/her individual account in the Kyrgyz Pension Fund. While in theory this law may assist Kyrgyz migrants, the operational mechanisms are not yet known and there is no public information about the progress in the implementation of this scheme.

An additional key problem nevertheless remains with undocumented migrants. These migrants are not allowed to contribute to the Russian Pension Fund because of their status, and thus will not be able to accumulate pension. They will have to continue to resort to informal and riskier savings alternatives, or may lack incentive to save altogether.

In addition to the continuing problems of the lack of access to health care and child education in Russia for migrant workers, practices that may be violating international human rights standards, social adaptation and integration of migrants in Russia constitute another important issue. Russia lacks policies on integration of migrants in Russian society, and there are no programs which include economic forms of integration that could promote access to the formal labor market and socially protected employment. Further, there are no existing social programs on access to voluntary social security, education and professional training, and few language and cultural integration programs available to Kyrgyz migrants.

An area of research and investigation for the TSPC might be on the following:

- What are the institutional, law, and policy frameworks that best provide migrant social protection in trans-border health and pension systems that can be advanced in the current negotiations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan to protect migrants and their families?
- Are there models or best practice now being used by other sending and receiving countries that could be useful to evaluate for the Kyrgyz-Russian context?
4. Involving Kyrgyz Diaspora, trade associations, and business groups

Since its independence, Kyrgyzstan has faced active migration movements abroad of its citizens and many communities are now members of an organized diaspora group. Kyrgyz diasporas have a large number of diaspora organizations abroad. According to the Zamandash Association, Kyrgyz diasporas exist in all continents of the world. There are 43 diaspora offices across the Russian Federation, at least 21 diaspora organizations in European countries, five in the USA, 14 in Asia, and three in Australia and Africa. The total number of migrants abroad is difficult to know as no accurate statistics exist. Importantly, there is potential to identify how to engage such diaspora groups in helping to prevent migrant abuse and helping promote migrant rights. Similarly, business groups and trade unions could play a role in supporting the rights of Kyrgyz migrants abroad.

Kyrgyzstan as a source country for migrants lacks any kind of policy on the Kyrgyz Diaspora and does not have representative government institutions abroad to interact with the organizations aside from the few consular offices or Embassy. In spite of large-scale labor migration from the country and high dependence on remittances, there is no coherent government program to engage the diaspora movements. According to experts, collaborating with diaspora organizations or encouraging migrants to join such organizations could promote the image of Kyrgyzstan as a country of tourism, attract professionals, contribute to designing development strategies of Kyrgyzstan, as well attracting investments and business opportunities into the country. Importantly, there is potential to also identify how to engage such diasporas in helping to prevent migrant abuse and helping promote migrant rights.

In recent debates held in Kyrgyzstan, experts suggest that the government could allocate some funds to conduct various events to attract donors. Kyrgyz Embassies abroad and foreign embassies in Kyrgyzstan could jointly carry out logistical support.

According to a survey conducted by the World Bank, among Central Asian countries Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have official offices dealing with their diasporas at the sub-ministerial level within their Foreign Affairs Ministries. Tajikistan has established a special office, while Kyrgyzstan does not have any dedicated diaspora office at the government level. Moreover, even the migration issues in Kyrgyzstan are now tackled at the sub-ministerial level. The Migration Ministry and the Committee on Migration at the Kyrgyz Parliament were dissolved, though the new government in Kyrgyzstan could reinstate these institutions. The absence of a government institution or comprehensive policy approach to address migration issues hinders better protection of Kyrgyz migrants at home and abroad.
One of the problems expressed by a representative of a diaspora organization in the Republic of Buryatiya of the Russian Federation is that diasporas can no longer officially represent their members and render timely help and assistance. The former Migration Ministry in Kyrgyzstan used to issue an authorization document for the heads of diaspora organizations in the remote areas of Russia to officially represent the migrants. This was important as Kyrgyzstan has only one diplomatic mission in Moscow serving the whole country. After the dissolution of the Kyrgyz Migration Ministry in 2011, the diaspora organizations lost their status to officially represent the members of their diasporas in courts or other institutions, where migrants need assistance. Some of the diaspora representatives expressed these concerns at the recent forums of compatriots held in Bishkek in July-August, 2012.\(^1\) A key question is to what extent the diaspora movement has played a role in reducing abuse of migrants abroad, and whether deeper collaboration among diaspora organizations and migrant rights groups is warranted to ensure greater protection from abuse.

A barrier to collaboration with the country’s diaspora population is the lack of comprehensive data on their numbers and characteristics. Because of poor migration control and lack of migration policy in the country, Kyrgyz agencies have no information on the exact number of people abroad. The statistics the Kyrgyz government obtains on migrants is solely based on statistics of the destination countries. The Kyrgyz government as yet does not have its own capacity or mechanisms for generating better statistics on migrants abroad.

The sending of remittances home has been the most visible and immediate way in which the government is seeking to encourage the diaspora to participate in development or poverty reduction in Kyrgyzstan. The potential is indeed great. According to some experts, labor migrants annually send around USD 2 billion to Kyrgyzstan as remittances, whereas in the first half of 2012 the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan estimates an increase in remittances by 17.4%.\(^2\)

Remittances have not yet translated into development in Kyrgyzstan. For example, professor Kathryn Anderson of the Vanderbilt University concludes that the remittances are not invested in the education of migrants’ children in Kyrgyzstan. She notes that the money is rather spent more regularly on buying furniture, household appliances, or other items than to buy a computer for a child, or to send the child to a good school or university.\(^3\)

The growing literature recommends various policies on how to better engage diasporas in the development of their home countries, how to attract the diasporas to invest and what policies the governments have to implement. Experts note that in many countries diasporas accumulate human, financial, and social capital for the development of their home country.\(^4\) A growing body of literature and policy documents suggest that the diaspora can be used as a source of development assistance, though how to effectively harness this potential is of some debate. Governments can play a crucial role in helping direct those remittances into economic growth and link the diaspora to the socio-economic activities of communities in their home countries through various policies encouraging investment. Transnational communities establish and
reinforce multisectoral links between countries of origin and destination. The challenge for policy makers in developed and developing countries is to create an environment that encourages and supports contributions by migrant diaspora to development.

One handbook on engaging diasporas highlights several directions in building a roadmap. The book sets out four stages of the road map that are relevant to governments of both origin and destination countries. Most of them are suitable for bilateral or multilateral partnerships and some, such as “twinning arrangements”, require partnership. The key features identified in the Handbook in the following paragraphs may be of interest in considering how to encourage and engage diasporas of Kyrgyzstan in protection of migrant rights, in addition to investment in the country’s economy.

First, the Kyrgyz government needs to think through how it wants Kyrgyzstanis, residing abroad to be able to contribute to development in the origin country. If Kyrgyzstan seeks to reduce poverty, its policy should focus on remittances, business investments, and capital markets. However, if the goal is to improve national competitiveness, its policy will have to emphasize the knowledge and skills that diasporas can channel, either through their own efforts or by connecting with home country institutions of learning and business. Once the goals of diaspora engagement have been articulated, the second crucial step for a government is to know its diaspora. This involves collecting data and mapping diaspora populations’ skills and experience, creating inventories of relevant information and conducting listening tours and surveys to understand what the diaspora has to offer and what it expects from the government in return.

Building trust with the diaspora is the next critical step. Diasporas have to be seen as more than simply *cash cows*. This can include taking steps to improve the business climate and greater transparency in business and investment regulations.

The final step is mobilization of the diaspora which is often done through creation of government ministries dedicated to diaspora relations. Means should be created to communicate with the diaspora, coordinate policies, and provide support and follow-up. Destination countries and donor agencies could play a role in this process as well.

With the visa-free regime, Kyrgyzstan and Russia might consider dual citizenship as approach to facilitate the mobility of diaspora members established abroad. Though Kyrgyzstan adopted a law on dual citizenship in 2007, dual citizenship terms have not been agreed to by Russia. This measure enables migrants to be active in both host communities and country of origin. Dual citizenship is crucial especially for business communities, as it opens doors for investing in the country.
Knowledge transfer and ‘brain gain’ is another area that could be developed further. This can be another segment of diaspora engagement which can be achieved by creating new mechanisms and favorable conditions for highly-skilled migrants. However, such policy should not limit intellectual migration but rather to capitalize on the positive aspects through the establishment of long term international academic contacts and the formation of elite diasporas abroad.

**Trade Associations and the Business Community**

In addition to the diaspora, an untapped sector of society both in Kyrgyzstan and Russia are the trade unions and the business community. Some trade union groups already engage in assisting migrants subjected to exploitation in employment (e.g., the Federation of Trade Union’s mobile assistance unit supported by CARMP in Moscow identified above). Businesses in Russia that have an interest in doing broader business in Europe, the U.S., or other markets may already support policies of good governance and corporate responsibility. By promoting policies that protect migrant workers or prevent abuse within their own businesses, or joining a broader coalition on corporate accountability, these forward looking businesses may gain broader appeal for their products that sell in larger consumer-oriented markets. For Kyrgyz companies, helping to facilitate policies that prevent recruiting firms from exploiting workers is also good business as it strengthens ties with communities in Kyrgyzstan, many of whom have migrants abroad.

Migrant rights groups and the Kyrgyz government may benefit from additional information on how coalitions work effectively in other regions. At a minimum, reaching out to, establishing and maintaining contact with trade unions, business communities, diaspora and migrant associations is an important step to ensuring that Kyrgyzstan adopts good policies related to migrant rights and to further help economic development in Kyrgyzstan.

**An area of research and investigation for the TSPC might be on the following:**

- What are the key challenges, opportunities and methods for better engaging the Diaspora networks, progressive business leaders, and companies in campaigns to stem labor abuses, discrimination and xenophobia in Russia, and are models from other regions/campaigns useful? (The Kyrgyz Zamandash alone has 43 separate networks in Russia from Vladivostok to Moscow.)

- How can collaboration among stakeholder groups in the Diaspora, human rights and migrant rights community, other NGOs, business, and government allies be maximized to more effectively create change, including through more successful coalition building, mapping NGO/advocacy expertise, data, and activities, and establishing a clearing-house for access to information, experts and networks?

**5. The role of new technologies in migrant protection**
It is widely believed that migrants have strong ties with their home communities. Migrants utilize various types of communication to reach out to other community members. New communication technologies in the globalized world are becoming more significant tools for migrants, in particular, by providing them with means to connect with family members and friends wherever they are located, but also for enabling a connection to consultancy services to assist them when encountering problems or abuse.

The use of cell phones and internet communication reduces distances by being able to maintain social relationships on a regular basis and facilitates access to crisis centers, hotlines, and advocacy services.

Social networks, blogs, twitter, and other means also have the potential to bring together key actors within the migration scene that may not only facilitate the formation of one-to-one partnerships, but also can form the basis for larger network structures in the host country. Communication networks are an important precondition for exchange of information that may support migrants in their new context, assist them when encountering conflicts or difficulties and guide new actors who wish to enter the scene with best practices. The extent to which Kyrgyz migrants use or could benefit from these types of mechanisms has yet to be fully explored.

**Information Services**

More and more groups are establishing assistance mechanisms for migrants. Most services involve consultancy services in various forms, such as hotline numbers, SMS services, information websites, information chat-services, online consultants, web-forums, and local information centers. These are mainly managed by international organizations, NGOs and trade unions.

The following includes some examples of established centers and launched projects providing services for migrants with the help of new technologies:

In Russia the IOM office in Moscow runs an Information-Resource Center offering legal assistance, assistance in planning migration by arrival, and information papers and pamphlets. The Center is located in the IOM office premises. One criticism is that the location makes the center not very approachable for migrants and consequently it may not reach all migrants in need of assistance. It is understood that the IOM is moving such services off-site in collaboration with an independent migrant rights group.

The Editor in Chief at the “Labor Migrant” Newspaper issued in Russia’s Kazan, introduced the “SMS-Lawyer” service, to which migrants can send their questions regarding migration legislation and legislation specific to Tatarstan. The answers to the questions are printed in the special column titled “SMS-Lawyer” in the next issue of the newspaper.
For many migrants, however, new technologies are not always available. With 17.1 million square kilometers of territory, remote rural areas of Russia lack consistent internet connection and mobile services. Landline telephone communication is not always connected to interstate lines, in which case a migrant from a rural place may not be able to reach help services. In addition, information about assisting services (hotline numbers) is not always available and omnipresent. Lack of communication services in remote rural areas of the Russian Federation and remote rural areas of Kyrgyzstan may be a barrier to providing urgent support in difficult situations. Migrants and their families located in those places may not have access to reliable communication, particularly when it comes to elderly generations and young children of migrants who also lack knowledge of using such technologies.

According to research among countries participating in the Colombo Process, technology should be used to streamline migrant support services in destination countries, which provide them with legal recourse, counseling availability and grievance redress. Means of technology can also be utilized to monitor the migrants’ workplace, assist in providing shelters within embassy grounds for migrants in distress and also partner with service providers, including civil society, to support the work of diplomatic missions.88

The existence of the Colombo process is an interesting one for Central Asian countries. The Colombo Process is a “Regional Consultative Process on the management of overseas employment and contractual labour for countries of origins in Asia,” that covers an estimated 2.5 million Asian workers who “leave their countries every year under contract to work abroad.”89

Due to the continuous growth of remittances and its significant impact to the GDP of countries, the issue of using new mobile banking technology combined with increased mobile phone penetration for remittances processes has also been raised to better accumulate and transfer money.90

An area of research and investigation for the TSPC might be on the following:

- How can new technology be marshaled to better assist migrant protection groups and networks that can benefit from increased communication capacity (such as open source web-based technology) whether in direct services, linking to national networks, or engaging regional and international assistance?
Report Preparation

Original research and writing of this report was conducted by Dr. Ainura Asamidinova, Program Manager for Migration and Social Protection of the TSPC, and Julia Perry, TSPC Research Fellow. Oversight, final research and editing was prepared by Michelle Leighton, Deputy Director TSPC. Additional editorial guidance was provided by Rodger Dillon, Executive Director, TSPC and Russian Translation by Adis Sydykbaev, Project Coordinator TSPC.

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For further information please contact:

**Michelle Leighton**, Deputy Director, Tian Shan Policy Center, AUCA
Email: leighton_m@mail.auca.kg

**Ainura Asamidinova** Program Manager, Migration and Social Protection Unit, Tian Shan Policy Center, AUCA
Email: asamidinova_a@mail.auca.kg
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Annex I

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
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Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of Table A.2.

Annex II

Figure III.24 – Remittances and foreign direct investment as proportions of GDP, Asian and Pacific countries or areas, 2009


Annex III
Relevant International Conventions

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ENDNOTES

1 Zitnanova, Kristina (2011): Refugee Protection and Migration Dynamics in Central Asia, UNHCR/IOM; 2011: 5;
2 See Annex I.
4 Id.
5 ILO "Labor Migration and Productive Utilization of Human Resources, 2009, Bishkek
You can quote the section below and find full report at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/info/publ/kri19oc09.pdf. See also, Human Rights Watch
6 Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis, Crisis Group Asia Report N°183; 2010: 1;
7 Zitnanova, Kristina, Refugee Protection and Migration Dynamics in Central Asia, UNHCR/IOM; 2011: 52;
10 Single Out – Russia’s Detention and Expulsion of Georgians, Russia, Volume 19 No. 5(D), Human Rights Watch, 2007: 10.
11 Single Out – Russia’s Detention and Expulsion of Georgians, Russia, Volume 19 No. 5(D), Human Rights Watch, 2007: 53.
12 ILO - Labour Migration and Productive Utilisation of Human Resources - Kyrgyz Republic; 2009: 52;
14 UNDP: Recent trends in remittances and migration flows in Europe and Central Asia: The best protection against economic crisis? http://europeandcis.undp.org/senioreconomist/show/065515FB-F203-1EE9-B5511CA5A95279B7. According to the ESCAP’s 2011 Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, the amount of remittances has strongly increased in the last few years, more specifically in 2009 remittances were very significant, as a proportion of GDP for Kyrgyzstan (22%), see Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2011, ESCAP, 2011: 13; 131 and see Annex III.
17 Human Rights Watch – “Are You Happy to Cheat Us?” - Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in Russia; 2009: 49.
23 Id. at 19-20.
24 Id at 19.
29 Id. citing the Migration Resource Center.

Id. at 48.

ILO - Labour Migration and Productive Utilisation of Human Resources - Kyrgyz Republic; 2009: 12;


Id. at 45.

Id.

ILO - Labour Migration and Productive Utilisation of Human Resources - Kyrgyz Republic; 2009: 7; 17.


http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38939; last accessed: early August 2012.


Human Rights Watch – “Are You Happy to Cheat Us?” - Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in Russia; 2009: 49.

Id. at 17.

Id. at 21.

Regarding the issue of human trafficking, the U.S. has placed Russia on a Tier 2 Watch List which includes “Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the [U.S. Torture Victim Protection Act] TVPA’s minimum standards, but are making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards” Trafficking in Persons Report 2012, U.S. Department of State Publication; 2012: 295; and see Annex III.


Singled Out – Russia’s Detention and Expulsion of Georgians, Russia, Volume 19 No. 5(D), Human Rights Watch, 2007: 18.

Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis, Crisis Group Asia Report N°183; 2010: 11-12;


Id.

Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis, Crisis Group Asia Report N°183; 2010: 12-13;


Id.

Id. at 102.


Id. at 31.

Id.
65 Human Rights Watch – “Are You Happy to Cheat Us?” - Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in Russia; 2009: 86.
67 Provision of gender sensitive services to migrants and members of their families: July 2011 - “Mobile consultations on the wheels”; www.unwomen-eeca.org.
69 Id.
76 Decree of the President of the KR No N 334 on “Increasing pensions scale in the KR” dated September 16, 2008.
79 “Chyngyz Shamshiev: Diasporas abroad could provide assistance to economic development in Kyrgyzstan”, http://www.knews.kg/ru/society/19783/, last accessed in early September;
80 “Harnessing the Diaspora for Development in Europe and Central Asia”, World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region, 2011;
81 Such difficulty is also seen when processing documents for “Cargo-200”. In particular, diaspora leaders were concerned that they could not send the bodies of deceased migrants through the airplanes or trains for the lack of officially stamped documents immediately available. They had to wait for official confirmation from the Kyrgyz Embassy in Moscow which takes several days and this is too long for a body to be kept unburied. During his official visit to the USA in the beginning of 2012, the former Prime Minister Omurbek Babanov met with Kyrgyz Club diaspora members, who urged him to push the issue of opening an additional Consular Office in Canada as there is only one mission in the U.S. to cover the continent.
84 “Migration and Development”, Essentials of Migration Management, Volume Two: Developing Migration Policy, IOM;
85 “Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development. A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries”, by D.R.Agunias and K.Newland, IOM - MPI, 2012;
86 Law of the KR “On citizenship” No 70, adopted in May 21, 2007;
87 http://moscow.iom.int/activities_labormigration_CARM_infocentre.html
89 See, e.g., information at website: http://www.colomboprocess.org/ on Colombo Process and other resources.