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European Positions on the Libyan Crisis of 2011:

France, Germany and Turkey

by

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Abbreviations

AU	- African Union
CFSP	- European Common Foreign and Security Policy
EU	- European Union
ESDP	- European Security and Defence Policy
FPA	- Foreign Policy Analysis
IOM	- International Organization for Migration
NATO	- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TNC	- Transitional National Council
UK	- United Kingdom
UN	- United Nations
UNSC	- United Nations Security Council
USSR	- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WW	- World War

Abstract

The thesis paper is concentrated on one of the most breaking news of the year, the Libyan Civil War. The main focus of the paper is to examine the stances of the three European countries (France, Germany and Turkey) regarding the Libyan conflict and the one of the European Union as a whole.

One of the main ideas of choosing the behavior of France, Germany and Turkey is that the stances of these particular countries differ one from another. The paper attempts to understand why France strongly trusts and supports the new Libyan authorities welcoming the fall of Muammar Gadhafi's regime whereas Germany takes quite a different position and Turkey gradually decides to act along with the EU.

This question is examined by applying foreign policy analysis theories, examining general trends, orientation and behavior of the focused countries. The author reviews the policy that the countries have adopted toward the Libyan Crisis and how it has affected their image in the EU. On the basis of the Libyan case, the author tries to formulate recommendations or possible actions for European Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Résumé

Le mémoire de fin d'études est concentré sur un événement qui avait explosé le monde en 2011, il s'agit de la Guerre Civile Libyenne. Le thème principal de la recherche est centré sur la position de l'Union Européenne dans son ensemble et celle des trois pays européens (France, Allemagne et Turquie) par rapport au conflit Libyen.

On a choisi les pays tels que la France, l'Allemagne et la Turquie à cause de leurs positions principalement différentes. Nous essayons de comprendre les causes du soutien des nouvelles autorités libyennes par la France qui approuve la chute du régime de Muammar Gadhafi alors que l'Allemagne prenne une position complètement différente, et la Turquie décide d'agir ensemble avec l'Union Européenne.

Pour examiner scrupuleusement cette question on a appliqué la théorie d'analyse de la politique étrangère, des tendances générales, de l'orientation et de la réaction des pays choisis ainsi que la politique adoptée par l'Union Européenne à la Crise Libyenne et son influence sur l'image de l'Europe commune. Ayant étudié le cas Libyen, l'auteur a formulé des recommandations et propose des actions possibles pour la politique étrangère et la sécurité commune.

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has been portrayed by many scholars as the world's newest superpower. The biggest common market standing behind European trading power makes this form of partnership seen as the potential predecessor of the so-called "United States of Europe". The establishment of the EU left a great mark in the history of the twenty-first century. Serving as a global actor and leader for other states, the EU has helped promote democracy and economic development throughout Europe. Thereby it has helped Europeans overcome their political, economic and social divisions.

However, for most people the European Union still remains as mysterious and enigmatic construction. Much to their revelation, the EU works and continues to change their lives. The reasons that many people are left uncertain and confused are that the EU is an unusual and even unique influential political actor which is not always well explained and which still keeps changing over time.

As a response, for those who doubt about the merits and achievements of European integration, one of the clearest examples of the gap between promise and achievement lies in the field of foreign policy (McCormick 337). According to the British political scientist John McCormick, "the EU is clearly an economic and trading powerhouse, and yet its critics argue that it is punching below its weight when it comes to turning its wealth into global political influence" (337). Regardless of many different attempts made to explain the contradiction, John McCormick suggests three fundamental problems that lie at the heart of the issue.

First, military power dominates most examination of international influence. For example, as one source states, the fact that the EU has not built a common military or developed a common security policy is seen by most critics as challenging

Europe's statements for global power. Second, the EU has been building a common foreign and security policy, and has established common stances and strategies on a big range of issues. Despite the above mentioned, the EU has been strongly criticized for its approach and the way it responds to problems in the Middle East and the Balkans. As a consequence, it has been left with much egg on its face. Third, as it is usually perceived by Euro-skeptics, more attention has been paid to the EU's short-term policy failures rather than to its longer-term successes. As a matter of fact, most outcomes the EU has gained throughout its foreign policy development have been a result of stable and secure contribution of time, diplomacy, and encouragement (337).

The international role of the EU gets more assertive, even if it's not always clear straightway or if the EU does not get as much credit for its achievements as it deserves. To this point, it's not merely its military credentials that make up the true strengths, but rather its impact as a new kind of civilian power. The EU has become so far an expert in employing economic rather than military power to achieve change, a quality that places it at an advantage in a world where globalization, economic investment, and international cooperation are the emerging norms (338).

Having provided with the basic understanding of the EU's role and its foreign policy, there is still a strong need to study this front from academic and theoretical perspectives in order to have a background for examining the foreign policy analysis (FPA) countries which the author decided to focus on. So as to have an insight into foreign policy analysis, one not only needs to be familiar with the dynamics whereby states interact with each other, but also the internal processes whereby foreign policies are formed also need to be examined.

It's crucial to understand the need for theory as well as empirical analysis of how any state conducts itself on the international stage. Furthermore, this

understanding includes knowledge of how the analysis must be made to adjust different approaches to the field. The theory is of little interest unless one can apply it in specific case studies. Therefore, the author of the paper addresses the Libyan Crisis in order to analyze the foreign policy of the focused European countries and the one of the European Union integrally. Subsequently, such kinds of empirical examples serve as one of the greatest pleasures to analyze the foreign policy theory.

Proceeding forward, the author will attempt to make the theoretical parts illuminate and explain the case study by applying the basic understanding of foreign policy theories. The study of foreign policy pushes scholars to think why x did z, whether he or she made the right choice, and what might have been the costs or benefits of the alternatives (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 1). “Foreign policy as a field of study gets us to step inside the shoes of policy makers, enter their world, and then judge whether – in light of the context – they did the right thing (and for whom?)” (1).

To support the importance of FPA theories, consider a seemingly empirical question such as “why the EU comes up with incoherent and uncoordinated plan in relation to the Libyan Crisis?” It may seem easy to answer at first sight, but after a thorough reflection one will encounter some pretty serious concerns, which can only be dealt with by either an explicit, or more likely an implicit, theoretical approach. What exactly the European Union is supposed to mean – Its leaders? The presidents of separate EU member states? The Europeans? European institutions or businesses? The European media? What is meant under the terms “incoherent” and “unconditional”? What is the foreign policy and Libyan Crisis as such? Answering these questions means placing oneself within a certain scrutiny of what foreign policy is, who makes it, and how its implementation is assessed. And here comes the idea of the theory.

Leaders have made many confusing foreign policy decisions throughout the years. Although some of those decisions may turn out to be of little consequence and be mostly forgotten, still in many cases such decisions usually make countries plunge into major crisis or war. Think about the Libya's Colonel Muammar Gaddafi whose strategy was puzzling so that he stumbled into accusations of crimes against humanity, arrest warrant, Libyan crisis which brought his country to civilian war and led not only to the end of his regime and political career but also to the loss of his family and the end of his life.

Besides, talking about the EU, it attempted to play an integral role at the time of the Libyan civil war believing in its unanimity and superiority while the decisions made by the European leaders had a crucial effect on the targeted region. During the time when a wave of social awakening has shaken the Arabian neighborhood of Europe, the Libyan crisis, as a part of this process, raised serious concerns for the European countries and the European Union. The performance of the EU was described with sharp criticism whereas the response of the UNSC to the Libyan crisis was met with praises for its "unprecedented speed and unanimity" (Morris). The EU was strongly criticized for being too slow, too weak, too divided, and essentially coherent (McNamara).

In this paper, the author aims to analyze stances of the three European countries (France, Germany and Turkey) and of the EU towards the Libyan crisis. What is the level of the EU's coherence in relation to Libya? What does their foreign policy make up? Which decisions do the European leaders make? In order to give a comprehensive picture and understanding, the author will thoroughly examine all focal points and organize this paper logically and accurately.

The author recognizes that the importance of relationship between the EU and NATO shaped within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is important part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. However, it must be underlined that the focus of the research is purposely moved to direction that did not involve analysis of above mentioned inter-organizational relations.

In the first chapter, the author starts by identifying the notion of foreign policy and by examining in details the nature of foreign policy analysis. This part tries to give a basic knowledge about foreign policy analysis on the basis of empirically informed theory in order to gradually be able to understand theoretically informed cases. As it has been already mentioned above, due to the essential of theoretical perspective the core points (foreign policy decision-making, psychology, and state-level explanations) of FPA are presented as determined by Valerie M. Hudson. Hence, the author studies theories of FPA which are going to be applied in the following chapters in order to analyze positions of each European country targeted in the paper.

The second chapter of the bachelor thesis paper is dedicated to the Libyan crisis. As a part of the Arab Spring, the author describes the reasons for the wave of social awakening in the North African region. Then, special emphasis is made on the Libyan Civil war for it serves as a primary case study for the paper in order to analyze the foreign policy of the targeted European countries and the one of the EU at large. Since the Libyan crisis as a part of the Arab Spring triggered serious issues for the EU it becomes important to understand what caused the riots of the Libyan people which soon turned into a general uprising against the colonel Muammar Gaddafi, who had ruled the country for over 40 years.

In the following chapter three the author proceeds to defining the positions that the national governments of France, Germany and Turkey take in relation to the Libyan crisis. The author recognizes that Turkey, despite the fact that it is not a part of the European Union, should be seen as integral part of European and EU security architecture and important player with policies partially integrated into to the EU. As these three countries represent different approaches the paper attempts to understand why France strongly trusts and supports the new Libyan authorities welcoming the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime whereas Germany takes quite a different position and Turkey gradually decides to act along with the EU. Thus, Europe seen as both EU's members and non-members is likely to come up with the comprehensive foreign policy based on the well-established short and long-term objectives. Such policy would combine both Europe's dedication to democratic values and its economic interests in both Libya and the Arab region.

Later in the same chapter, special attention is paid to describe the Libyan interaction with Europe applying the foreign policy analysis. It summarizes the overall approach of the EU towards Libya. As the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi plays one of the most important roles, one section is dedicated to him in particular. Analyzing the EU's foreign policy, the author aims to assess the coherence of the EU's strategy and approach towards Libya. As a result, the author gives recommendations for European Common Foreign Policy taking lessons from the Libyan case.

The bachelor thesis paper draws on insights from academic work, foreign policy analysis by leading think tanks, official publications and leaders' speeches. The research shows that individual actions of the EU member states mainly account for the EU's incoherent response. As a result, the author attempts to analyze the causes of

incoherence and tries to provide a comprehensive image and recommendations on how the EU could increase its coherence in the future.

Methodology

The type of research method that the author has chosen to employ is qualitative approach due to its significant advantages. The use of qualitative method is valuable in this study for it evokes a more realistic feeling in data gathering and allows its flexibility, research analysis and interpretations of gathered information. According to Bruce L. Berg, qualitative research includes such methods as historical analysis, document and textual analysis, as well as refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things (3).

Furthermore, the main methodology used to prepare the thesis paper has been the textual analysis of selected documentation. Speeches given by EU officials, the Lisbon Treaty and the UN resolution are used as the primary source for the paper. Secondary sources encompass books, newspaper articles, journals, periodicals, reports and other EU publications. Throughout the thesis paper the author applies content analysis as analytical methodology in order to study the archived human communications consisting of books, web sites, articles and other periodicals. As Bruce L. Berg determines, content analysis examines written documents or transcriptions of recorded verbal communication. He also mentions it as “any technique for making inferences by systematically and *objectively* identifying special characters of messages” (240).

In this way the content analysis makes it possible to discover the essence and purpose that lie in its assumption as well as understand and support the conditions behind the main hypothesis of the thesis.

Theoretical framework

As the basis of this paper lies in foreign policy analysis, the author applies neoclassical realism, as a theory of international relations, in order to seek to analyze both the behavior of focused individual states and their interactions. According to a neoclassical realist Gideon Rose, also a Deputy Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, neoclassical realism argues that the scope and ambition of a state's foreign policy is primarily driven by the state's relative material power. However, it asserts that the impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complicated because systematic pressures must be interpreted through such elements as decision-maker's positions and state structure. It is necessary to examine both international and domestic contexts within which foreign policy is shaped and applied in order to understand the connection between power and policy.

Neoclassical realism is a combination of classical realist and neorealist theories. As stated by scholars of neoclassical realism, the theory argues that the actions of a state in the international system can be explained by three types of variables which are systemic variables (such as the power distribution among countries), cognitive variables (perception and misperception of systematic pressures, intentions or threats of other countries) and domestic variables (state institutions, elites and societal actors within society). Consequently, three types of variables influence the power and freedom of action of the state leaders in foreign policy. Furthermore, consistent with the neoclassical realism, decision-makers' incapacity or inability to activate state power and public support can incite imbalance within the international system, the rise and fall of great power, the crisis and war.

According to Gideon Rose, neoclassical realists reject the idea that the first and foremost aim of the states is security. Instead, states seek to use their power to

direct the international system towards their own goals and interests. Such factors as state structure and leaders' behavior change international politics and determine responses. That is why the paper also examines the basic theories and concepts of foreign policy analysis. In this way, application of theoretical framework facilitates understanding of foreign policy and provides a wider explanation and prediction of the foreign policy behavior of particular entities.

Chapter 1: Definition and Theories of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

1.1 Foreign Policy, its definition, history and evolution

Even if considering states as unitary actors on the world stage is regarded as useful, it does not necessarily have to be accurate. On the contrary, when analyzing the Libyan case it is crucial to believe that a state is not a single conscious being. Looking at it from the view of foreign policy, actions of a state are a composite of individual human choices, be they political leaders, diplomats and bureaucrats. This particular chapter looks at the state from inside out, trying to understand the processes that make the EU take the actions toward the Libyan Civil War; as we actually saw them in action.

As Joshua S. Goldstein determined, foreign policies are the strategies used by governments to guide their actions in the international arena (163). Foreign policies of the focused European countries (France, Germany and Turkey) spell out the objectives state leaders have decided to pursue in a certain relationship with Arab countries or Libyan situation as well as the general means by which they intent to pursue those objectives.

Tracing back to the meaning of FPA and its historical idea, the study of foreign policy analysis, theoretical ground of which is human decision makers, has been developed throughout the process of examining by historians and other scholars why national governments have made the choices they did regarding interstate relations. FPA-style work within the field of International Relations per se is best dated back to the late 1950s and early 1960s (Hudson 12).

According to Richard C. Snyder, the foreign policy process is all about the process of decision-making. In one sense, countries take certain actions because

people in national governments, that are decision-makers, choose those particular actions. Decision-making is a process in which regulations or changes are made as a result of feedback from the outside world. Decisions are made by actions taken in order to change the world, and later, information from the world is observed to evaluate the effects of these actions (Snyder 127). In this way, foreign policy is the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities. This includes decisions to do nothing (Hudson 12).

The foreign policy analysis is the subfield of International Relations that seeks to explain foreign policy, or, alternatively, foreign policy behavior, with reference to the theoretical ground of human decision makers, acting singly as well as in groups. Valerie M. Hudson proposes that the subfield has several marks which are a commitment to:

- look below the nation-state level of analysis to actor-specific information;
- build actor-specific theory as the interface between actor-general theory and the complexity of the real world;
- pursue multicausal explanations spanning multiple levels of analysis;
- utilize theory and findings from across the spectrum of social science;
- viewing the process of foreign policy decision-making as important as the output thereof (12).

Therefore, in order to study the foreign policy analysis of the targeted states the author applies the above-mentioned hallmarks identified by the referred scholar. For further progress, it's crucial to be able to distinguish actor-general theory from an actor-specific one. Actor-general theory explains the behavior of actors generally, such as game theory. But an actor-specific theory describes the behavior of specific actors, such as Foreign Policy Analysis theory. This type of theory may be broad-

spectrum, but under specific scope conditions for applicability. Given its nature, actor-specific theory allows for wider explanation and even prediction of the foreign policy behavior of particular entities than does actor-general theory (12). Hence, it becomes clear that the actor-specific theory of foreign policy is the most appropriate one in the case of paper's main subject. By means of an actor-specific theory it's possible to get a richer explanation of certain decisions and actions and accordingly move to foreign policy behavior evaluation of particular countries.

Going back to the hallmarks of foreign policy determined by Valerie M. Hudson, the study of Richard Snyder and his colleagues inspired scientists to look *below* the nation-state level of analysis to the players involved:

We adhere to the nation-state as the fundamental level of analysis, yet we have discarded the state as a metaphysical abstraction. By emphasizing decision-making as a central focus we have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision-makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers. Hitherto, precise ways of relating domestic factors have not been adequately developed (Snyder et al 53).

Applying this approach, Snyder and his colleagues formed characteristic emphasis on foreign policy decision-making as versus foreign policy outcomes. Decision-making was best viewed in the sense of organizational behavior where the basic elements would be scopes of competence of the actors involved, communication and information flow; and motivations of various actors.

The particularities of human beings making national foreign policy are vitally important to understanding foreign policy choice. These particularities could be

regarded under the topic of FPA theories where special attention is made on the nature of states' behavior and on leadership of their governors. Various levels of analysis, ranging from the most micro to the most macro, should be well integrated in the provision of such theory. The knowledge of all the social sciences must be drawn on in this effort. The essential of this idea was and continues to be the "hard core" of foreign policy analysis.

1.2 Classical factors of foreign policy analysis

States establish different organizational structures and functional relationships to create and carry out foreign policies. All these elements make up principle tools by means of which decisions are made. States take actions in international affairs every day which in turn generally reflect the overall policies in relation to other external states. The study of foreign policies includes examining the substance of various states' policies. For instance, what are Iran's plans regarding the spread of Islamic revolution in the Middle East or what are France's aims with regard to the North African region? In order to discover possible answers by the use of empirically informed theory the paper looks deep into basic classical factors of foreign policy.

The following overview comprises the classical foreign policy analysis that examines how the particularities of states lead to differences in foreign policy choice as well as behavior. Foreign policy analysis elaborated a number of comparable research pathways such as models of decision-making, individual decision-makers, group dynamics, the concept of crisis management and their influences on outcomes of a leader's choices.

1.3 Decision-making and its models

Foreign policy decision-making is an important way of research because with the help of examining the way decisions are made one can come up with identifying the final choice. To put it simply, the study of decision-making can help understand why Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had decided to go for violent responses toward his nation country. Although not long ago before the Libyan Civil War he signed friendship treaties and trade deals with major Western leaders and presented himself as an active partner in the fight against terrorism and illegal migration (Koenig 2). In this sense, the idea of decision-making stimulates to get us into the shoes of the state leader and realize the reasons for courses of action.

There are different outcomes which depend on the decision process. Leaders are usually the ones who make choices. The development of world politics is formed by leaders' decisions. Leaders in turn make different decisions such as whether to go to war, make peace, form an alliance, establish diplomatic relations, impose economic sanctions, or ratify global environmental agreements (Mintz and DeRouen 3).

The EU's foreign policy that includes the course of national foreign policies means decisions that the EU leaders make which consequently influence EU's reputation and position on the world stage. Ambiguity and vague rationality of the EU's resolution on the Libyan Civil War obviously affected its image. Theoretically, foreign policy decision-making refers to the choices that individuals, groups, and alliances make that accordingly affect state's actions on the international arena. Foreign policy decisions are typically characterized by high stakes, enormous uncertainty, and substantial risk (Renshon and Renshon 509).

There are three main models of decision-making: **rational**, **organizational process** and **government-bargaining** (or *bureaucratic politics*) models. In rational

model of the process, decision-makers calculate attempt to maximize, which means that they select the best alternative out of a set of alternatives by evaluating the benefits and costs of each alternative and selecting the one that has the highest benefits. Many foreign policy decisions are taken under certain time constraints. According to scholars, there is a sequence of steps through which rational decisions are made. It includes the following components:

1. *Clarify goals* in the situation.
2. *Order them* by importance (in case different goals conflict).
3. *List the alternatives* available to achieve the goals.
4. *Investigate the consequences* (probable and possible outcomes) of those alternatives.
5. *Choose* the course of action that will produce the best outcome (in terms of reaching one's goals) (Goldstein 166-67).

However, the choice may be complicated by various issues such as uncertainty, risk, stress, ambiguity, accountability, time and information constraints. In such cases, decision-makers must assign probabilities to each possible outcome of an action. From the case studies one can see that some leaders or decision-makers are relatively accepting of risk, whereas others are opposed to risk. These particular factors influence the importance that decision-makers place on different alternative outcomes that could result from an action. For example, Muammar Gaddafi's decision to enforce military power and commit violence against his nation obviously showed a high acceptance of risk.

The rational model may suggest that decision-making is simpler than is actually the case. In fact, decision-maker may have different diverging goals simultaneously. A leader's choice to use military force could be made as a means to

win reelection, but not in pursuit of any national interests. The rational model of decision-making thus is somewhat complicated by uncertainty and the multiple conflicting goals of decision-makers.

Another model of decision-making is called organizational process model. In this model, foreign policy decision-makers generally skip the labor-intensive process of identifying goals and alternative actions, relying instead for most decisions on standardized responses or standard operating procedures (Goldstein 1967). These decision-makers, who are regarded as low-level ones, usually apply general principles or simply try to make the least controversial, most standardized decision, one that will not get them into trouble with their superiors.

The last alternative model to the rational one is government bargaining (or *bureaucratic politics*) model where foreign policy choices result from negotiations among several government agencies that hold somewhat divergent interests in the outcome.

According to foreign policy scholars, the level of uncertainty involved in foreign policy making can relate to, for instance, an opponent's motives, beliefs, intentions, or calculation. If one understands how decisions are made, he or she is more likely to better understand or, moreover, predict possible outcomes in the international stage. Therefore, there are key decision units of foreign policy that one should bear in mind when analyzing case studies.

1.4 Individual Decision-Makers

The foreign policy scholars state that individuals are considered the only true actors in international relations (Goldstein 168). Every event-taking place on the world stage is the intended or unintended result of decisions made by individuals. The study of individual decision-making revolves around the question of rationality. Individual level decisions are more likely when leaders have an excessive amount of power within a state. The decisions of individuals aggregate into the behavior of groups, coalitions, and states. Powerful leaders typically do not need to seek consensus in decision-making. Probably the best examples would be Mao Tse-Tung of China, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Joseph Stalin of the USSR, Napoleon of France, Kim Jong-il of North Korea, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq (Mintz and DeRouen 19).

The role of individuals in foreign policy decision-making is critically important especially during times of crisis. Political psychologist Margaret Hermann says that such factors as crises, high-level diplomacy, and leader interest increase the probability of individual-level decision-making (19). For instance, a decision of Muammar Gaddafi to go to war is associated with decision-making by a dominant individual. Or, from the side of France, it may be decisions of Nicolas Sarkozy to participate in international summits, to be the first leader to support the fall of Gaddafi's regime and recognize the Transitional National Council (TNC) and to use military power against Gaddafi's forces.

In the meantime, it is important to keep in mind that the study of individual decision-making notably focuses on psychological factors such as the personality of the decision maker, operational codes, learning, evoked set, cognitive consistency, and misperception (Mintz and DeRouen 19).

1.5 Group Dynamics

As it is quite predictable, in this type of foreign policy decision unit choices are made jointly by groups instead of all powerful individuals. On the one hand, groups promote rationality by balancing out the lacks or biases that any individual could provoke. Consequently, interaction of several individuals in a group may result in the rational formulation of goals that more closely reflect state interests rather than individual peculiarities. However, on the other hand, group dynamics are still possible to introduce new causes of irrationality into the decision-making process. The reasons for that may be psychological dynamics that occur within groups, and the ways that the structure of group decision-making processes can bias the outcomes (Goldstein 173).

Therefore, as it becomes clear, unlike the individual-level model, certain group dynamics can influence the decision process. For example, members strive to avoid the conflict that often occurs in groups and work toward concurrence (Mintz and DeRouen 19).

1.6 Crisis Management

The risks for encountering difficulties when reaching rational decisions are increased during crisis both for individuals and for groups. In political sense, crises are foreign policy situations in which results are very important and time frames are quite compressed (Goldstein 176). Crisis decision-making is harder to understand and even more to predict than is normal foreign policy making.

At this point decision-makers usually face many challenges and work under tough situations that appear to be hallmarks of crisis. As a rule, they experience time

constraints, information constraints, ambiguity, familiarity, risk and stress. Those who are exposed to crisis decision-making are not only rushed but they also go through tremendous issues such as severe psychological stress, time limits, lack of solid information, obscure situations with multiple possible outcomes and so on. As a result, it becomes difficult to carry out calculations before making decisions. Yet this does not necessarily mean that a bad decision will be made. Sometimes time constraints and pressure can force a decision maker to stop and pay a particular attention to the problem at hand and actually enhance a decision so as to ensure the best possible outcome out of it (Mintz and DeRouen 26).

Due to the significance of the sound decision-making during crisis a great attention is paid to the psychological stability of leaders. That is why the majority of people attempt to explore the personality and behavior of decision-makers. To sum up, it is crucial to consider decision units and key psychological, environmental, international, and domestic factors that shape foreign policy decision-making. The goal of this paper is to observe and understand why and under what reasons decisions of the world leaders were made concerning the Libyan crisis. To accomplish these tasks, further chapters illustrate already analyzed theories, models, and concepts of foreign policy decision-making through the given case study.

Chapter 2: Analysis of the Libyan Crisis 2011

2.1 Colonel Muammar Gaddafi

In an attempt to describe the state of the Libyan crisis we need consider stances of many scholars, politicians and officials that associate the crisis with various terms. The mass media particularly is the one platform which proposes a big variety of terms among which the most appropriate one for the Libyan crisis is its identification as a civil war. According to James Fearon, a scholar of civil wars at Stanford University, a civil war is defined as “a violent conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in a region, or to change government policies”. The principle aim of one side may be to take control of the country or a region, to achieve independence for a region, or to change government policies.

The crisis in Libya of 2011 can be described as a civil war and a dramatic change in the rule of Libya. It was a breaking event that has shaken the whole world and raised particular concerns for the European Union. It is important to consider that Libya’s strategic importance comes from oil, which contributes to the primary source of its revenue. It is oil that some European countries heavily rely on. As for Europe as a whole, Libya has been in the spot mostly with regard to the following matters: natural gas, oil and migration. In other words, since many years ago the main issue has been the control of their major natural resource. But before talking about the EU’s strategy to keep the flow of oil and gas stable and control the flow of immigrants it is necessary to address the individuals who stand behind the EU – Libya cooperation. State actors and leaders, one of whom is the ruler of Libya the Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, have been playing an integral role in presenting interests of participating

countries and in stimulating changes of nations. The following overview aims to provide information on Gaddafi's personal traits and to give some insight into the reasons for his behavior and type of ruling. In this way, it will help understand why Gaddafi acted the way he did and whether he made a right choice.

Muammar Gaddafi has been constantly described as Africa's and the Arab world's "longest-ruling, most erratic, most grimly fascinating leader" ("Profile: Muammar Gaddafi"). From knowing him as a guide of revolutions and tyrant it is possible to assume that there were harsh conditions and a relative environment in which he grew up. In fact, Muammar Gaddafi was a deeply religious person, which can be associated with his first educational experience. He had a very strong personality with a really sharp memory, was devoted to reading books on ideology, philosophy, history, and military science and also liked to deliver impromptu speeches (El Saadany 57-58). Therefore, judging from his background, one can come to realize the causes and consequences of Gaddafi's further deeds.

Libya's hostile relationship and long-lasting conflict with Italy may serve as one of the brightest examples of Gaddafi's personal and historical grudge with Italians. At the age of six, Muammar Gaddafi was wounded and witnessed the death of his two cousins when an old mine exploded as they were playing on the desert near his native city Sirte. Since that day, in 1948, when the colonial Italian Royal Army buried that mine the enduring hatred started, which engendered enmity and conflict between two nations. In addition to geographical reasons, that is the two countries facing each other on opposite sides of the Mediterranean, the explosion is said to have influenced Gaddafi's political choices and his later views in relation to Italy (Mimmo).

Furthermore, in dealing with people, he positioned them in sharp contrasts of black and white, good or evil, gentle or violent, friends or enemies. There were no shades of gray in his judgment. This may be one of the usual characteristics of the Libyan people, who are exposed to a rough life almost from the birth, and learn to endure and preserve in harsh desert conditions (El Saadany 57). After leading the bloodless coup d'état against King Idris of Libya, who reigned the country from 1951 to 1969, and later coming to power in 1969 Gaddafi abolished the monarchy and the old constitution proclaiming the new Libyan Arab Republic, with the motto “freedom, socialism, and unity” (“Libya: History”). Upon his continuous efforts, Gaddafi’s vision of a United States of Africa resulted in the foundation of the African Union. He governed Libya and kept tight control of his oil-rich country for four decades. Throughout his regime, Gaddafi tried to merge Libya, Egypt and Syria into a federation but ended with failure. The same attempt was made without success to join Libya and Tunisia.

However, as Muammar Gaddafi took power he had been condemned for using force and brutality during his regime and accused of repressing civil society. His leadership was sharply criticized as a military dictatorship. Gaddafi was in charge of a number of violent acts against humanity, crimes, murders, and massacre. As it becomes obvious, the Libyan ruler had a strict personality pursuing arrogance and aggression. This could be seen, for instance, in his televised speech of February 22 in 2011 where he vowed to hunt down protesters against his autocratic rule “inch by inch, room by room, home by home, alleyway by alleyway” (Kershner). As a result, it caused a furor and fiery indignation amongst his people that escalated upheaval against him. Referring to the choices he made and the acts he performed, Muammar Gaddafi adapted different titles such as “the Brother Leader”, “Guide of the

Revolution” and “King of Kings” (“Gaddafi: Africa’s ‘King of Kings’”). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that throughout his ruling and the stabilization of relations with the Western countries the leader has ensured growth of the Libyan economy and benefit from the oil industry in particular. By this means, researchers emphasize current situation and changing position of the Arab countries in the world and the elaboration of a new continental strategy that would support global development.

2.2 What is the Libyan Crisis about?

The principal concern in this chapter is to examine the roots of the Libyan crisis so as later to be able to understand the motives for different approaches of the European states. It is equally important to examine the wave of social awakening in the Northern Africa, as the Libyan Crisis was a part of the Arab Spring 2010. The Arab Spring was a revolutionary wave of protests and demonstrations that took place in the Arab world on 10 December in 2010. It was an ongoing surge of striking and unexpected riots that led to political and economic transitions in the Southern neighborhood of Europe. There were many nations where people organized massive attacks and clashes. In such countries as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen as a result of the rebellions their rulers have been ousted from power. Civil uprisings have exploded in Bahrain and Syria while major protests have broken out in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Oman. Meanwhile, minor protests have occurred in Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Western Sahara (Donnison).

Mainly these protests have presented civil disagreement, resistance and struggle in continued campaigns evoking strikes, demonstrations, marches and rallies. Most of those protests have met violent and brutal responses from the state leaders. The most important and primary goal of the demonstrators in the Arab world was to put an end to an autocratic ruling and bring down the regime. Ultimately, there were

many reasons that have led to the protests, including such issues as dictatorship or absolute monarchy, human rights violations, government corruption, economic decline, unemployment, extreme poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors such as a large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the population (Cockburn). In general, this was all about people's pursuit of freedom, justice, dignity, social and economic opportunities, and democracy.

As one of the most shocking and brutal changes in the Arab world, the Libyan crisis of 2011 presented the most challenging political and economic shift faced by its people. On February 15 of that year riots took place in the city of Benghazi, which gradually led to clashes and later escalated into a revolution or general uprising against Muammar Gaddafi that spread across the whole country. Thereby the Libyan Civil War turned into an armed conflict fought between Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his opposition willing to oust his government. The durable regime of Gaddafi came to respond with massive repression and violence against civilians. Following the rebellion, on the 5th of March the opposition established the Transitional National Council (TNC) in Benghazi, an interim governing body chaired by Gaddafi's former justice minister Jalil, and presenting itself as the sole representative of the whole Libya (Mahmoud).

In addition to universal values that people of the Arab Spring sought for, one of the reasons of the Libyan people for revolution were the concentration of wealth in the hands of an autocrat who reigned the country for four decades, insufficient transparency of its distribution, and corruption. Taking their lead from the nations of other Arab countries, Libyans started demonstrating against their long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi and calling for more freedom and justice. As a matter of fact, Colonel Qaddafi had been the longest-serving head of state of any nation in the world

except for King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand and Britain's Queen Elizabeth II ("The world's longest serving leaders"). The population in Libya wanted a more free society, where they could have more freedom to come out and speak. In comparison with Egypt or Tunisia where their governors had to resign their power and surrender, as they could not rely on their armies to defend them against their own nation, the Libyan leader took quite a different position for that matter. It is important to consider the fact that Libya is a country where the population is split up amongst different tribes or clans. Therefore, Muammar Gaddafi had a tribal following of supporters who were ready to protect and fight for him and, thus was able to meet the protests with the guns of his well-equipped army and maintain attacks on his population.

Meanwhile on 26 February, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted the resolution imposing an arms embargo as well as strict sanctions ("UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011)" 3-6). Due to ongoing clashes and violence against civilians, UNSC passed further resolution establishing and enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya and using all measures to protect civilians and prevent attacks. On 19 March, a multi-national coalition, headed by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, began a broad operation of air strikes against Gaddafi's armies. By the end of March, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command of all air operations. The ongoing crisis led to thousands of victims and caused a refugee and humanitarian crisis. External Situation Report by International Organization for Migration (IOM) shows that, as a result, more than one million Libyans and third country nationals had fled Libya (2).

Thus, as seen from the review of the Libyan Crisis above the demonstrations in the country are especially remarkable for the bravery and consistency shown by its people. Qaddafi had remained in office for so long by severely controlling soft power,

using bribes and the manipulation of tribal loyalties. It is necessary to note that it is due to these tribal divisions that Muammar Gaddafi had managed to maintain his attack and power for so long.

The response of such international communities as the UNSC to the Libyan crisis was praised for its “unprecedented speed and unanimity”, whereas the performance of the European Union was met with sharp criticism. The EU’s reaction was criticized for being too slow, too weak, too divided, and essentially incoherent (Morris). Some already mourned the death of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: “The CFSP died in Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it” (Armellini).

After having analyzed the foreign policy analysis theories, reviewing the Libyan Crisis, its leader and causes it is time to begin the study of the interference of European countries and the EU as a whole. The following chapter attempts to examine the level of coherence of the EU’s response to the Libyan crisis. It tries to reveal the fundamental causes of incoherence. As a possible solution, the following sections try to give targeted recommendations for European Common Foreign and Security Policy on how it could increase its coherence in the future. In order to offer a comprehensive picture and potential recommendations, the paper refers to the theory and distinguishes a set of certain types of coherence. However, the focus of the paper lies in analyzing the basic stances of the European states. The author reviews the policy that the countries have adopted towards the Libyan Crisis and how it affected their image in the EU. In general, the paper draws on insights from academic work, policy analyses by leading think tanks, press coverage, and official documents.

Chapter 3: European Responses to the Libyan Crisis 2011

3.1 France's Position on the Libyan Crisis

One way to look at the approach of France is through an accurate description of key elements behind French foreign and security policy stated by the British scholar Jolyon Howorth:

“France, the eldest daughter of the Church, the home of Enlightenment, the cradle of Revolution and of the Rights of Man, aspires, way beyond her frontiers, to stamp her mark on Europe, to extend her influence to the world, to evangelise, to colonise and to carry far afield her colours and her conception of freedom.” (156)

France is considered as a country that has aspired to develop her civilization and system as a model for all mankind. Since World War II France has succeeded to make her voice heard in several key areas of international policy: NATO and Europe, the Arab World, Africa, world trade policy (Howorth 156). France's position as one of the global powers was strengthened by its cultural, diplomatic and military presence all over the world, special importance in Africa and leading role in Europe. Yet, France and Africa share a long and reach history full of many ups and downs. The long lasted historical relationship has affected the position of France in regard to the Libya crisis in particular.

France was one of the first countries that supported the fall of Gaddafi's regime, recognized the Transitional National Council (TNC) and declared there should be a military no-fly zone over Libya. Supposedly, French foreign policy experts wanted quick reaction from France in Libya because it had been criticized over its slow reactions in Tunisia and Egypt. As claimed by the expert Ulla Holm,

“France wants to represent itself as the country that knows about the south. Sarkozy wanted to act as quickly as possible in relation to Libya in order to forget what happened in Tunisia” (Vela and Lehtinen). As it becomes clear, France tended to represent itself as if it knew the south and were aware of its strategy. In other words, France preferred to avoid possible mistakes and take a lesson from the history. That is why France played an active role in presenting its interests and participating in a number of summits regarding the Libyan Crisis.

According to neoclassical realism, ambition of a country’s foreign policy is first driven by its relative material power. States aim to use their power to direct the international system towards their own goals and interests. Meanwhile such elements as the French policy’s structure and Nicolas Sarkozy’s behavior change the international politics and determine response. To demonstrate the theory on an empirical case, France has been criticized or even accused by other leaders of focusing more on the oil resources, gold mines and underground treasures in Libya rather than on humanitarian aspects. “I wish that those who only see oil, gold mines and underground treasures when they look in that direction would see the region through their conscience from now on,” said Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Vela and Lehtinen).

Both France and Turkey hoped to be regional powers in North Africa when trying to respond to the Libyan uprisings. Thus, as neoclassical realism claims, France tended to be seen as a major player in the Mediterranean region due to its own interests and goals. Tracing back to history, after World War I, Britain, France and Italy replaced the Ottomans as colonial powers in North Africa. Foreign policy experts explain that because of its colonial past, France considers the area as a part of its sphere of power and influence. Even though Libya was never a French colony (but

it used to be an Italian colony and was known as an Italian North Africa), France wants to play a role in the entire region. “France has a very close relationship with North Africa because of its colonial past. France has close ties with the Europeanized elite, especially in Morocco and Tunisia” (Vela and Lehtinen).

The main concern regarding the France’s approach to the Libyan case would be exploring the motives that led France to adopt such a proactive and yet impulsive position on the diplomatic and military levels. Mostly, scholars refer France’s motivations to the French president’s effort. Nicolas Sarkozy is known for his continuous interest to place his country and himself on the spotlight of the international game. As the development of world politics is formed by leaders’ decisions, the French stance owes its origins to the president’s behavior and individual decision-making, which in turn comes from his leading interests especially during the crisis management. It is important to note that throughout Sarkozy’s term of office the president clarified interests of redressing his badly damaged national prestige thanks to his global active role. Equally important is to pay attention to Nicolas Sarkozy’s intention to maximize his chances in presidential election of 2012 by means of positioning France in the middle of world politics and capitalizing on his success over Libya. Another interesting fact is that of April 2012, six weeks before the first round of the presidential election on April 22, when Nicolas Sarkozy was faced with damaging allegations about his links to Libya under former leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. A left-wing political website, Mediapart, claims to have documentary evidence that Mr. Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential campaign received 50 million euros from the Gaddafi regime. The document refers to an “agreement in principle to support the campaign for the candidate for the presidential elections, Nicolas Sarkozy, for a sum equivalent to 50m euros” (“France President Nicolas

Sarkozy snaps at Strauss-Kahn”). However, the French president denied the given allegations in TF1 news report and called the claims “grotesque” saying that in case Gaddafi had financed his campaign he wasn’t very grateful referring to the role he played in Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011 (“La “prevue” du financement de la campagne de Sarkozy en 2007 par Kadhafi?”).

Hence, it is also clear that Sarkozy’s hawkish attitude can be explained by France’s poor performance in the early stage of the Arab spring. In this case, the Libyan crisis was obviously seen as an opportunity to strengthen France’s role in the European context: “the recent euro crisis has once again demonstrated Germany’s dominant economic role, and Sarkozy’s diplomatic and military activism is a reminder that the asymmetry between Paris and Berlin works the other way round when it comes to political and strategic clout” (Bozo).

In fact, the crisis management in Libya served as an analysis for the future of the European role in the political and strategic dimension. Sarkozy’s ambition to build Europe as a significant power on the world scene has been clearly seen throughout the crisis. Thus, another challenge for France was to be recognized as a leader and earn credibility. Also, Sarkozy’s approach was abundantly criticized whether with regard to his alleged unilateralism in recognizing the rebels or in ordering early strikes (Bozo). Yet, when assessing France’s international stance one should not forget to consider the leader’s character, impulsive style and controversial personality. Throughout the whole crisis period the French president must have been attentive when bolstering the European foreign policy as his approach was assessed on its ability to provide balance since “Libya involves much more than the future of the Sarkozy presidency” (Bozo).

3.2 Germany's Position on the Libyan Crisis

During the Libyan Crisis Germany has been well known for its hesitant response to the crisis for which there are various explanations offered by politicians and foreign policy analysts. Some scientists suppose that it is history that has influenced and has later become one of the reasons for Germany's stumbling position. In other words, scholars refer to Germany in the time of being responsible for two world wars in the last century. As a consequence, being afraid of the historical account Germany continuously had serious issues with participating in UN peacekeeping and military mission (Neuen 1). It could be assumed that the national, collective guilty for horrible wars explains decades when Germany abstained from participation in a number of operations despite being one of the most leading member states of the European Union. Understandably, Germany demonstrated a criticized and divided position in the Libyan case. Taking all of this into consideration, Germany's response has been even called a nightmare in this regard (1).

Indeed, it is necessary to briefly mention the general highlights that have influenced the image of Germany and that of the European Union as a whole. The Security Council members (including the United States, United Kingdom and France) voted in favor of the UN resolution whereas only one opposing vote from the EU member states came from Germany, which presented a non-permanent member of the UNSC since the 1st of January in 2011 ("Germany 2011/2012 UN Security Council Member"). The major reason for Germany's abstention was concern regarding expanded military conflict. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle saw considerable risks and showed skepticism about the option of a military intervention in Libya contained in resolution. Namely, it was exactly this part of resolution that Germany did not agree to subscribe to.

Consequently, the German government found itself in puzzle, and not with their allies, but rather against them (1). The German opposition supported the position of the government from the very beginning. However, with the given reaction to the UN resolution the German foreign policy was faced with harsh criticism. For instance, Germany's former Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer strongly criticized the German abstention stating that the state has lost its credibility in the United Nations and in the Middle East. "German hopes for a permanent seat on the Security Council have been permanently dashed and one is now fearful of Europe's future." ("Fischer Joins Criticism of German Security Council Abstention"). Klaus Naumann, the former general inspector of Federal Defence Force, Bundeswehr, had similarly condemned Germany's reaction declaring its hopes for a permanent Security Council seat could be buried and that even the idea of an EU seat was damaged already. "Germany as turned the idea of a unified European Union foreign policy into a farce" ("Fischer Joins Criticism of German Security Council Abstention"). As can be seen, abstention was regarded as a fiasco for German foreign policy.

In the meantime, another key point was what further changes Libya would come afterwards. With this in mind, the leaders of the NATO mission, France and Great Britain, wanted to prevent Libya from becoming an Iraq or Afghanistan on the other side of the Mediterranean. However, according to Der Spiegel Online, German Defence Minister Thomas de Maizière explained that the decision not to participate militarily was based on carefully considered reasons ("We Will Not Get Involved in Syria"). To put it another way, one can apply here foreign policy analysis theories stepping inside the shoes of the Defence Minister and calculating the costs and benefits of the possible alternatives. In this case, it becomes logical to judge whether the right decision is to be made on the assumption of the given circumstances. For this

reason, it is possible to assume that Minister Thomas de Maizière uses the rational model of decision-making process, evaluating costs and benefits of each alternative and maximizing outcome.

To point it out, Thomas de Maizière said in a Spiegel interview, “When you start something, you of course always have to know how long you can keep it up. I believe that each military operation must be analyzed to determine whether its goals can be achieved with appropriate means and within an appropriate time frame as well as how one gets out at the end. Everyone.” That is to say, the German Minister makes the decision through a sequence of steps like clarifying goals, ordering them, listing the alternatives, investigating consequences and finally choosing the action with the best outcome. In turn, response of the German government is complicated by various issues such as risk, uncertainty and stress. From the Libyan case it can be noted that decision-makers from the part of Germany are relatively opposed to risk. Therefore, these particular factors have influenced the course of action towards Libya and also affected Germany’s actions on the international arena. Germany’s position, despite its flaws and criticisms from its own state and other allies, may not necessarily be seen as the best decision made. However, it might have been the right one to successfully see an end to the Libyan conflict and Germany’s partnership with the Arab neighborhood.

To sum up the German approach to the Libyan crisis, it may be noted that Germany was taking a great care of its image and position in the Arab world than of a coherent foreign policy of the Western allies as part of the European Union, NATO and the UN. Under those circumstances, such behavior of Germany has, in fact, adversely impacted the development of the European foreign and security policy. For this reason, Germany’s position has demonstrated that the EU is not likely to rely on Germany in terms of developing a common EU stance on main issues in foreign and

security policy. The German stance has put under question the sense of developing the European Common Security and Defence Policy. Moreover, since Germany abstained from the vote at the UN Security Council, it may find it more difficult to acquire permanent membership in the Security Council.

As the German foreign policy is influenced by the “World War II syndrome”, it is based on a set of value-oriented priorities contributing much to its peace policy. This can be clearly seen from preventive approaches that Germany adopts when setting the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons and supporting in particular the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative. In this capacity, German foreign policy attempts to maximize the globalization outcomes and minimize its risks (“Germany’s foreign policy parameters”).

3.3 Turkey’s Position on the Libyan Crisis

More than a decade ago Turkish relations with its neighbors and the European Union were tense and conflict-prone. Its economy was in the process of a major recession. Going back to historical framework, Turkey was surrounded by serious ethnically driven conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucasus, while Turkey itself was experiencing a violent internal ethnic dispute involving its own Kurds (Kirisci 7). Nowadays, Turkey has carried out major economic and political reforms that have brought it to the gates of EU membership so far. However, Turkey still finds itself in the core of a problematic region in turbulent times. All things considered, Turkey is now trapped between two sets of challenges. The first set includes the typical challenges that relate to national security, territorial integrity and political stability. The second set of challenges has to do with supporting the pace of political reform, achieving access to markets, ensuring economic stability and growth in the region, as well as securing energy supplies (7). Yet, closely related to these sets of challenges, is

of course the fundamental challenge for Turkey – the EU membership. Against this background, the Libyan crisis has posed another tough challenge for Turkey's foreign policy. The crisis shaking Libya only intensified the view that Turkish diplomacy is mainly focused on profiteering.

Following the Libyan Revolution the approach that Turkey adopted was significantly different from the position it took toward other Arab countries faced with popular uprising as well. As most politicians, scholars and media publishers give much credit for the state of cooperation between Turkey and Libya, it is noteworthy to note their long and sometimes troubled history. Turkish representatives have stressed the country's deeply rooted historical ties with Libya, which are based on common history, social and cultural resemblances and expressed hopes that relationship would be preserved in the future. Before the start of protests and violence in Libya, the two countries had recently enhanced economic ties (*Küçükkoşum*). In the beginning of the outbreak of the Libyan revolution, Turkey was cautious not to issue any official position associating it to either of the two sides. In its behavior with the Libyan crisis, Turkey followed a course based on a principle of "avoiding a reaction" ("Turkey's Position on the Libyan Revolution").

The past decade witnessed the first actual shift in Turkish foreign policy away from the western course. In particular, Turkey's attention was focused on the Middle East arena as an active one in its policy. Thus, Turkey was able to take important steps in developing its relations with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa particularly on issues on the level of commercial exchange and economic cooperation with the states that Turkey found popular acceptance for various cultural causes ("Turkey's Position on the Libyan Revolution"). Furthermore, Turkey's positioning was reflected in its relations with Libya. According to Iranian online

Khabar magazine, Turkey has hugely invested in Libya and numerous Turkish entrepreneurs and contractors, technicians and workers are busy on working there (“Libya crisis poses a challenge for Turkey's foreign policy”). Moreover, the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies mentions that Libya stated its goal to invest 100 billion dollars worth of investment in Turkish companies until 2013; they also announced that 15 billion dollars had been invested in Turkish construction companies (“Turkey’s Position on the Libyan Revolution”).

In the meantime, talking about the leaders of two countries, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had good relations with the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, and during a certain period had strongly opposed military intervention and, in particular, NATO’s involvement. However, Turkey declared different positions on the Libyan crisis starting from its repeated concern over NATO’s military intervention, calling for an immediate cease-fire in Libya instead, then announcing that Turkey was both against the slaughter of Libyan people and foreign intervention calling it counter-productive and finally, changing its position and supporting NATO’s operation. The major reason for such a fluctuant behavior or ambivalent position of Turkey mostly had to do with its long history of Libyan relations which, in turn, made the Turkish government take a cautious stance toward the North African country using careful language to address the violence. Although Erdogan and his colleagues in Turkey's administration strongly strived to extend their political influence to even remote areas in North Africa, but yet it was not clear to what extent their dual position would benefit their country.

Scholars generally consider Libya as a real challenge for Turkish foreign policy. In essence, pragmatism of the Turkish position was based on the realism of Turkish foreign policy that sought, as Western powers did, to balance the potential

benefits and losses affecting its national interests before producing a dominant policy towards Libya. Therefore there can be no doubt that the Turkish government's position towards Muammar Gaddafi and the revolution in Libya has influenced Turkey's image at the popular level in the Arab world ("Turkey's position on the Libyan Revolution").

3.4 Libyan Interaction with the EU through FPA

As of today, the relationship between Libya and the European Union is not linked by contractual terms so far. According to the web site of European Union External Action, after the lifting of sanctions in 2004, an informal dialogue started with a vision to strengthening EU – Libya relations. In 2008, negotiations of a EU-Libya Framework Agreement began and ten rounds of negotiations took place until February 2011, when they were suspended by the new events.

Even though the European states have played a prominent role in the military operation in Libya, the crisis, however, showed serious disagreements between them and exposed the EU to a sharp criticism. It should be noted that many of the EU member states of NATO so far did not participate in the military intervention whereas other states were contributing at largely different levels. The split response of the European Union to the Libyan revolution demonstrated difficulty for Europe to support a common foreign policy and to respond to crisis unanimously through multilateral frameworks. They have exposed the weaknesses of the defence structures that the EU has been thoroughly working on for the last two decades. To be more specific, the EU made an unsuccessful attempt to prove its claims that the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force on 1 December 2009, would make the EU able to deliver a quick response and compensate for internal divisions of its institutional structure. Considering the EU's reaction to the Libyan crisis, it has shown despair of a

certain set of provisions stated in the security and defence policy area of the Lisbon Treaty.

The Lisbon Treaty presented a potential and commitment to tackle the major issues happening worldwide only being able to do so by improving the way it works. As the world changes fast, Europe doesn't stop facing huge challenges either. Today the West is forced to encounter such issues as economic crisis, sustainable development, climate change, security and international cross-border crime. By this means, ratification of the Lisbon Treaty was another attempt to equip the European Union with the tools it needs to face these challenges and deal with new changes. Proceeding further with the topic of the EU's foreign policy, it is necessary to refer to one of its historical events, the crisis in the Balkans. It was one of the basic motives for claiming that the Lisbon Treaty would give the EU more capacity and make it better fitted to take action than it was in the twentieth century. In 1991, as Yugoslavia fractured, a former minister of Luxembourg Jacques Poos stated that "this is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans". In the result, the minister's statement appeared to be a public ridicule and since then the EU has attempted to improve its capacity to manage regional crises, and to resolve its military shortcomings. It has been creating foreign security policy institutions, aiming at improving military and civilian competencies, refining decision-making procedures and forming leadership positions. The primary goal behind their willingness to change has been to make the European Union be able to tackle international crises in a coherent and vigorous manner. However, in the beginning of the twentieth century "the EU jostled for position in security and defence policy with NATO, carving out a role for its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) supposed to be complementary to NATO, an organization which itself had long moved beyond its core business of

collective defence into crisis management operations” (“War in Libya: Europe’s confused response”). Therefore, since the Lisbon Treaty ratification, which reformed the EU’s structures, people strongly believed that Europe would become more adequate and capable to react than it had been back in the Balkans crisis. Nonetheless, the Libyan Crisis of 2011 has proved claims of the EU quite on the contrary.

One of the principal changes designed in the Lisbon Treaty was creation of the new position of the President of the European Council for a maximum of five years, who is currently Herman van Rompuy from Belgium. The major motive for the creation of president’s position was to work further on a continuous and consistent basis. The Treaty also created a new position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is currently Lady Catherine Ashton from the UK, in order to encourage the EU action on the international level and to be more competent to defend its interests and values abroad (“War in Libya: Europe’s confused response”). Finally, External Action Service was created in order to reinforce the common foreign policy. The EU’s 10 year old European Security and Defence Policy was “upgraded” and retitled the Common Security and Defence Policy (“War in Libya: Europe’s confused response”).

Taking the aforementioned creations of the Lisbon Treaty into consideration, one could clearly notice that in the recent Libyan crisis none of these institutional reconstructions has counted for much. On the contrary, it becomes less feasible considering the complex and competitive disputing which has challenged the EU member states against each other. For NATO as well, the basic differences of vision between the European countries were problems in identifying the proper supervision and command structures for the operation and deploying the military assets required

(“War in Libya: Europe’s confused response”). Furthermore, as one of the main goals of the Lisbon Treaty is to help the European Union speak with one voice in the world creating a possibility of enhanced cooperation between the EU member states that wish to work together more closely in the area of security and defence policy, the Union in fact proved it conversely. To demonstrate its divided response, EU member states were disagreeing at largely different levels: Italy, Malta and Cyprus held out for a week against French, German and Dutch proposals to impose sanctions on the Gaddafi family in the beginning of the Libyan crisis (Koenig). The response of the UNSC to the crisis was praised for its “unprecedented speed and unanimity” whereas the EU was met with harsh criticism. In other words, the EU’s position to the crisis was criticized for being too slow, too weak and essentially incoherent. Besides, some already mourned death of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: “The CFSP died in Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it” (Morris). The analysis of the previous sections of this chapter can additionally show the reasons for being largely incoherent and, as a result, sharply criticized. To put it precisely, the main cause for the EU’s incoherent approach towards the Libyan crisis was the lack of coherence expressed by the presence of different national stances of EU’s member states. For instance, France strongly trusted and supported the new Libyan authorities welcoming the fall of the Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime whereas Germany took quite a different position abstaining from participation in the international intervention.

The institutional opinion aimed at articulating a common EU position, that of High Representative Catherine Ashton, was effectively silent while she was trying to define what exactly caused the lowest political common denominator among member states. In fact, she was the last official to call for sanctions in comparison with the

French government who was first to support the fall of Gaddafi's regime, recognize the Transitional National Council and to use military power against Gaddafi's forces. Meanwhile, other European leaders and politicians were making numerous proposals for the way the EU should have reacted to the crisis. Catherine Ashton's resistance to the no-fly zone reinforcement led to a blazing public row with the British Prime Minister David Cameron and with the French President Nicolas Sarkozy at a European Council meeting in March (Koenig 4). As a matter of fact, the High Representative felt that in clearly formulating an EU position she had to pay particular attention to those member states that were uncomfortable with EU playing a lead role and especially a military role ("War in Libya: Europe's confused response").

In the mean time, the European Commission reacted to the Libyan crisis by implementing two of its major emergency tools, which are the civil protection mechanism and humanitarian assistance. The civil protection mechanism facilitated member state operations by combining and determining transport means for evacuation of Libyans. Later the European Commission and the member states have contributed a lot in terms of humanitarian aid and civil protection, making the EU the biggest humanitarian donor to Libya (Sedghi and Marsh).

To sum up the Libyan interaction with the EU in the framework of the theoretical account, according to neoclassical realists, beliefs of the European officials, or decision-makers, strongly affect the relationship between relative power and foreign policy. These beliefs may be inadequate or cause distortions unforeseen by the structural realist (Rose). Therefore, the neoclassical approach helps understand the reasons for unusual features of leaders' behavior or idiosyncrasies such as the EU's incoherent approach to the Libyan crisis through its attempt to strengthen its foreign policy.

Altogether as for the political control of the mission, the overall image is pretty much obscure. Thus, the Libyan crisis of 2011 has once again in the history of the EU's foreign policy provoked further disputes, divisions and unconformity of foreign policy regulations among European countries. Consequently, it shows that twenty years after the Balkan crisis exploded, the European Union still remains far from being ready and competent enough to prove its role as a both regional and a global power. As a targeted recommendation, it would be worthwhile to emphasize that the EU is better not to rush to intervene unilaterally in regional conflicts but instead apply the rational model of decision-making process and tend to promote partnership with regional actors.

3.5 Recommendations for European Common Foreign and Security Policy

Having thoroughly analyzed the empirical case of the Libyan crisis with the theoretical perspective from the positions of France, Germany and Turkey and from the one of the EU as whole, let us now turn to a brief assessment of their coherence and seek to provide a targeted recommendation for further foreign policy development in case of the ongoing Syrian crisis. As it has been mentioned throughout the paper, the main obstacle for an effective EU foreign policy and reason for the EU's internal division over Libya lies in the lack of coherence. According to the European Security Strategy of 2003, the EU can only develop towards an effective foreign policy and crisis management to its full potential if it becomes "more coherent" ("A Secure Europe in a Better World" 11-13). The idea of "common" foreign policy implies the common existence of goals and interests. The common interest does not develop automatically. It is the result of a process of overcoming national interests for the sake of a shared common interest (Churruca). The common

interest also stems from the presence of common values which the European Union wants to support and improve on the international level.

However, the challenge consists not merely in bringing together common interests, divergent internal and external EU policies and instruments, but also in guaranteeing an adequate implementation and coordination with the respective policies and instruments of the member states. And according to the main provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, increasing the level of coherence of the EU's external action is also one of its main goals. Yet, one will come to realize that the given incoherence stands on the EU's way as the major obstacle for its effective response to the Libya crisis. In fact, coherence, often referred to as "consistency", is usually described as the absence of the contradiction between various crisis management policies and instruments, and "the existence of synergetic effects between them" ("A Secure Europe in a Better World" 4). Taking into account the construction of the EU as a multi-level governance system and the wide multilateral framework in which the EU crisis management has been taking place, the author provides a further detailed explanation of coherence and distinguishes between its four dimensions basing on the online publication of "Coherence in EU external action: the case of humanitarian aid".

The first dimension is identified as the *horizontal coherence* which designates the extent to which the different EU crisis management policies are coherent with one another. Policies or policy instruments are horizontally coherent if the goals they pursue and the means they use do not contradict each other, and are mutually supporting.

The second dimension refers to an *institutional coherence* which implies an interaction between the different institutional actors that distributed responsibility for the EU's crisis response. Institutional coherence means an absence of contradictions

between the actions of different EU actors responsible for the EU-level crisis response.

The third dimension, a *vertical coherence*, describes the degree to which national policies and activities of the EU's member states are in line with, and support the EU-level crisis response.

The fourth dimension, a *multilateral coherence*, designates the degree to which the EU's crisis response is in line with, and positively contributes to the response of other international actors, such as in this case, UN, NATO and the African Union (AU).

Basing on the above-mentioned coherence dimensions let us move forward to an ultimate overall assessment and analysis of the coherence of the EU's response. In fact, the EU-Libya interaction during the crisis makes up nothing more than an obscure image of the EU's foreign policy. The EU's reaction to the Libyan crisis has been horizontally coherent, but the instruments of one policy have not always been appropriate to reinforce the goals of another. However, according to the Lisbon Treaty provisions, the EU did not succeed in terms of speaking with one voice on the international scene. The European officials have been generally described the EU's role in the framework of multilateral crisis management as "business as usual" (Koenig 13).

Still it would be a somewhat too sharp criticism to stress that the EU's response to the Libyan crisis was weak or ineffective for it was not generally. The EU has been anyway acclaimed for its quick and substantial delivery of humanitarian aid. "Unilateral actions or inactions, mutual accusations and ensuing tendencies of disintegration mainly account for the EU's perceived incoherence" (Koenig 13).

To conclude, after making a deep research and referring to suggestions of foreign policy scholars, the author comes up with following recommendations for the EU in order to demonstrate a more unilateral, efficient and effective EU foreign policy in case of the Syrian crisis, for example. Given the existence of 27 EU member states that are sovereign and believe in their independence and freedom of choice, the EU should aim to increase its leadership for coherence, work out and consolidate consensus in the medium-term and prevent divisions in the longer-term. The European officials should actively foster implementation of policies and ensure the systematic exchange of information and analyses, thereby promoting “bottom-up coherence” (Koenig 14). Another incoherent approach of the EU has to do with European member states’ different perceptions of concepts like “burden sharing” and “solidarity”. Thus, in order to prevent incoherence in the longer-term, the EU should take measures to rebuild trust between the member states and work towards a common interests and strategic culture.

Conclusion

Research and analysis of the thesis paper supported by compelling evidence allow for clear assertion that the EU's response to the Libyan war has been incoherent and divided. The EU did not succeed to articulate its stance with one voice and to act as unified actor in terms of diplomatic stance and military crisis management. However, when it comes to the future of Libya or Europe's Arabian neighborhood, it could be supposed that the EU would assume leading position, and use its turn to maximize outcomes of the post-conflict reconstruction and minimize risk of further aggravation.

It is important to note that the Libyan crisis has not only been the first major conflict since the Lisbon Treaty ratification but it has also demonstrated the capacity and enthusiasm of the European Union to act together with the international agreement and to support the common values and interests of its present 27 member states. On the contrary, the EU's response to the ongoing violent conflict has been sharply criticized by many European scholars and politicians for exposing the EU's weakness to manage the crisis in a coherent and efficient manner. However, in order to avoid subjectivity, the author mainly analyzed the EU – Libya case basing on the given materials, independent reviews and official publications. Besides, it is necessary to consider that the EU has been nevertheless successful in protecting its citizens and third-country nationals residing in the conflict area as well as in the delivery of humanitarian aid. Due to Gaddafi's death on October 2011 and a gradual break of the conflict, the Libyan entered a process of reconciliation and reconstruction facing post-war challenges. From now on it is the EU's high priority and primary concern to contribute to the Libyan reconstruction (Gottwald 1).

The title of an article published in Aljazeera in October 2011 states “Gaddafi is dead, but the revolution lives on. As one battle comes to an end, another begins today” (Sadiki). The author of the article claims that the time for “the post-Gaddafi Libya” has come to breathe life into the new Libya. While the international intervention put an end to the Libyan civil war and provoked its slowdown. However, he admits that it is also generated a new set of challenges. The biggest challenge in the post-conflict Libyan environment will be to manage the legacies of Gaddafi. Lardi Sadiki questions if Gaddafi is dead and believes that he is, physically. Yet, the task for the Libyans now is to reveal what part of Gaddafi’s socio-political heritage is alive, and what dies with him. However, the Libyan state lives on deserving freedom, proud and sovereignty achieved through an ongoing revolution. And for its civilians the primary challenge is to establish democracy that would seek neither self-glory nor returns to corruption and oppression (Sadiki). This is exactly the main principle of the European Union by supporting the period of the Libyan reconstruction. In this case, the real test for the EU’s foreign policy is yet to come.

To sum up, the lesson that the EU could derive from its intervention is to engage in the development of the post-conflict state by supporting the Libyans in quest of peace and security by means of integration, political reform and rule of law. As the EU has attracted the worldwide attention, particularly the one of the media, however, the EU’s biggest concern for the present should not be public attention but a provision of the democratic and smooth transition process. “The last thing the EU wants is a country that falls into pieces right on the EU’s doorstep” (Gottwald 6). Libya’s reconstruction will be the main challenge for the EU but should not be left behind in the light of recent actions in the cases of Syria and Egypt. Moreover, the EU possesses the needed skills and instruments to face these challenges. Therefore, the

only way for the EU to make up its poor performance in the first months of the Libyan crisis is to make substantial efforts in the post-Gaddafi Libya by means of diligently contributing into a well-coordinated reconstruction.

Limitations of study

Although the thesis paper was carefully prepared, the author is still aware of its limitations and shortcomings. A key element of the quality of the thesis paper is the quality of the insights and thinking brought by the particular researcher. When reading publications or any other official documents, one admits the issues he or she could judge to be important. In other words, as the paper draws on insights from academic works, official publications and leaders' speeches, the author did her best in order to present the thesis paper as objective as possible. Like any other researcher, the author tried to present adequate evidence, from the data, to support the idea articulated by the author.

Suggestions for further research

An important outcome of such a thesis paper is a set of new questions that can be used as ideas for further research, as detailed research always reveals additional questions. One focus for further research is another similar case to the Libyan one. That is, judging from the current political situation in the world, the researcher could come up with investigation of an ongoing internal violent conflict in Syria. By this means, the findings of this thesis papers could have been successfully used in case of another similar case. Furthermore, as the research of the present thesis paper was conducted in 2011-2012 academic year, whereas the Libyan civil war officially lasted

from February till October of 2011, not much literature was published on the given issues of the paper's subject. Therefore, the researcher could be able to take advantage of new literature elaborated in future and conduct a more detailed and supported by a number of scholars research.

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